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INTRODUCTION
This interim report, produced by the Mineta Transportation Institute’s National Transportation 
Security Center (MTI/NTSC), a National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (NTSCOE) 
for the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), provides data on terrorist attacks against public bus transportation targets and serious 
crimes committed against such targets throughout the world. It then presents some preliminary 
observations drawn from those data.
The report is part of MTI/NTSC’s contribution to a project collaboratively funded by the 
Transportation Security Administration–Transportation Sector Network Management (TSA-TSNM) 
and S&T-DHS to develop a Mass Transit Bus Operator Behavioral Awareness Program. Three 
other NTSCOEs are participating in the project: Rutgers University, Tougaloo College, and Texas 
Southern University. MTI/NTSC has provided statistical analyses of bus attacks, case studies, and 
subject matter expertise throughout the project, which began in September 2009 and will end in 
December 2010. 
The data presented here are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, 
to which additional incidents are added either as they occur or as they are painstakingly culled 
from existing collections that do not focus specifically on transportation security. This analysis is 
based on the database as of December 17, 2009; the most recent attack included in the analysis 
took place at an Israeli bus stop on December 13, 2009.
Most of the charts used in this report were used in presentations to the DHS Counter-IED working 
group on November 12, 2009, and to a bus-operator focus group on December 3, 2009. The 
charts from both presentations are reproduced in Appendices A and B.
This report will be revised and peer-reviewed and will be published as a formal MTI report in spring 
2010. The final report will include MTI’s most current data, so some of the statistics and preliminary 
conclusions will probably differ from those presented here. The final report will also include a more 
detailed look at a smaller set of data that will include approximately 50 recorded attacks against 
bus targets in North America, Western and Eastern Europe, and modern industrialized countries of 
Asia, whenever they occurred. It will also include the most recent attacks for which information is 
available from campaigns in Israel, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. 
This more detailed analysis will attempt to identify sets of attacks in which
Particularly lethal tactics and weapons have been employed, including the use of suicide •	
attackers.
Actions by on-scene security personnel, operators, or passengers would likely not have •	
stopped or mitigated the attack without significant advance warning. 
Enhanced awareness and actions by security personnel, operators, or passengers did in •	
fact prevent or mitigate attacks.
Particularly lethal bombs or incendiary devices were used.•	
Bombs or incendiary devices malfunctioned or were ineffective.•	
Multiple bombs were involved, timed to detonate to increase casualties, especially among •	
emergency responders. 
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ThE MTI DATABASE
OvERvIEW
MTI/NTSC started publishing chronologies of attacks on public surface transportation in 1997. 
These chronologies, which included some, but not all, such attacks between 1920 and 2000, 
were published in two MTI reports, the first in 19971 and the second in 2001.2 These seminal 
publications on public surface transportation security helped to inform Congress; federal, state 
and local government agencies; and transit operators. Serious criminal attacks were included 
because terrorist groups observe and learn from criminal tactics and also sometimes conduct 
criminal actions to finance their operations.
In 2009, MTI/NTSC began creating a database that includes both its own chronologies and all 
attacks captured in the second release of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) created by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), based at the 
University of Maryland, a DHS Center of Excellence. The entries in this database, which we refer to 
as UMSTART, contain narratives of the details of surface transportation attacks between January 1, 
1998, and December 31, 2007. MTI/NTSC also regularly updates its database to include attacks 
found in lists created by U.S. and other government and industry entities. All of the lists either are 
not specifically designed for transportation threat and security analysis or lack details and require 
painstaking analysis and interpretation to sort aspects of each attack into sets that will facilitate 
trend analysis. The MTI database also includes attacks identified through open source searches, 
as well as attacks that are not captured in other lists. It seeks to include all attacks starting in 1970; 
its record of attempted train derailments goes back to 1920.
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolving nature of the database as attacks are added. Between Septem-
ber 1, 2009, and November 12, 2009, 178 attacks were added, 80 percent of which (144) were 
against bus targets. Most of these attacks took place after 1974; 11 of the attacks took place 
between 1970 and mid-1974. Most of the additional incidents were identified through concentrated 
searches of campaigns against transportation targets in Israel, Russia, Turkey, India, Pakistan, 
Colombia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. 
On July 14, 2009, when MTI first described the database at the FTA/TSA Safety and Security 
Roundtable, the database included 1,049 attacks. As of December 13, 2009, it contained 1,497 
attacks. About 90 attacks are added each month, and MTI estimates that by mid-2010, it could 
include as many as 2,000 attacks. 
To make the database more robust, MTI is working with explosives experts within and outside 
the government to share information that will enable it to better analyze the effects of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs). It is also using a smaller set 
of data—including those that will be used in the final MTI report—to test the feasibility of adding 
new fields that require access to original data. Finally, MTI is also moving the database from its 
current Excel© platform to a platform that enables median calculations as well as mean (average) 
calculations to be conducted to provide a truer picture of both the past likelihood (distribution) and 
the lethality of different kinds of attacks. 
Figures 3 and 4 list some of the current fields in the system. There are 37 categories of targets 
and 26 categories of attacks and weapons, eight of which are considered “bombs or incendiaries.” 
The database also has 16 categories of methods of delivering and concealing devices and six 
categories of outcome, e.g., whether the devices detonated on target and on time, malfunctioned, 
or were rendered safe.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
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figure 1
figure 2
Current Data
• New attacks captured since 9/01/09, mostly for buses 
and some for train stations: 
– 1,384 (1,206) attacks on all public surface transport
– 438  (  416) attacks against passenger trains/stations
– 354  (  338) explosives attacks against passenger trains
– 684  (  540) attacks against all buses
– 439  (  336) explosives attacks against all buses
• Time:
– All attacks:  January 1970 (July 1974) to present
– Attempted derailments –1920 to present (11 out of 91 occurred 
between 1920 and 1970)
• Sources:  
– 1920-2009:  Published MTI chronologies and updated open 
sources
– 1998-2007: UMSTART accounts with narratives
Recent and Planned Enhancements
• Recent:
– Added almost 200 new attacks from terrorist campaigns against buses 
in Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Colombia,
Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, and some train station and 
road attacks.
– Focused road attacks on those clearly aimed at bridge and tunnel
destruction or road system disruption. 
• Under way: 
– Information from explosives communities on recent explosives attacks.
– Additional data fields (see next two slides) on 50 bus attacks (for bus 
operator project) train attacks; 50 train attacks will then be added.
– Moving to more stable and robust platform.
– More powerful system will enable multiple median calculations which 
will give a truer picture.
• WE ARE SEEKING YOUR SUGGESTIONS
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
The MTI Database 5
figure 3
figure 4
New fields being tested for inclusion on entries of recent attacks, for which more detailed information 
is available, are listed in Figure 5.
Some Current Fields
Targets (37 types):
• Bus (scheduled, school,  
tourist, government)
• Train (intercity and commuter 
passenger, subway, trolley, 
elevated, government, tourist)
• Train infrastructure:  track, 
bridge, tunnel, 
communications
• Stations (enclosed, open air) 
and bus stops
• Vehicle highway, road, bridge, 
tunnel
Weapon and Attack (26 types): 
• IED & IID
• VBIED
• Assault automatic weapons
• Assault with RPGs
• Arson
• Sabotage by derailing, or other 
sabotage
• Robbery, armed hijacking, and 
kidnapping
Some Current Fields for Explosives
Explosives (8 types)
• IED Unspecified
• Mines and Claymore mines
• Dynamite
• Grenades
• VBIEDs
• IIDs
• Other
Location
• Above or under ground
• In enclosed or open area
Outcome (5 types)
• Detonated or released on target
• Malfunctioned, detonated, released 
early or away from target
• Failed to detonate or release
• Detonated during unsuccessful EOD
• Rendered safe
Delivery and Concealment (16 types)
• On person (suicide)
• Left in bag or parcel in train or bus
• Left in station or bus stop
• Left outside station or bus stop
• Left in passenger compartment of train or 
bus
• Left in non-passenger compartment of 
train or bus
• Placed on tracks or near trains
• Placed near buses
• Physically thrown
• Other
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
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figure 5
COMPARISON Of ThE MTI DATABASE AND UMSTART
The MTI database does not compete with UMSTART; rather, it complements UMSTART. MTI’s 
database is designed to allow for updated trend analysis of attacks on public surface transportation. 
UMSTART allows more general analyses to be performed. The MTI database therefore serves a 
purpose that UMSTART does not provide because of its broad mandate and design.
Roughly 40 percent of the 1,497 attacks currently in the MTI database were obtained from 
UMSTART (which is credited as the source of the data). The remaining 60 percent come from 
MTI’s own published chronologies and recent scans of news reports (this percentage will inevitably 
increase). MTI also uses UMSTART’s list of countries and regions, and for incidents for which it 
is the sole source, its information on fatalities, injuries, and perpetrators. Both UMSTART and the 
MTI database indicate whether attacks involve suicide and also provide other useful information. 
But there are important differences. 
First, MTI’s database contains more early attacks against surface transportation and is continually 
being updated, whereas UMSTART’s published data currently extend only to December 31, 
2007.
Second, there are significant differences in the level of aggregation. UMSTART aggregates 
transportation attacks into two categories: transportation and aviation (airports and airlines). At 
the data analysis level, it does not distinguish between attacks against public buses, public trains, 
subway trains, and their stations and stops, or between highways, bridges, and tunnels. It also 
does not distinguish between attacks against public transportation and attacks against private 
citizens, or it does so inconsistently. Searching UMSTART for attacks against transportation 
will not capture all of those aimed at public surface transportation, nor will it allow the user to 
differentiate between train, bus, and road attacks. By contrast, MTI’s database includes only 
Some Future Data Fields 
• When attacks take place (peak versus off-peak)
• Size of cities in which attacks take place
• Type of train or bus, type of service, and any other data on environment in 
which bombs detonate
• IED details: type and size of charge, type of detonator and timer 
• Success in detecting attack/device:
– Intelligence
– Security personnel
– Employees
– Passengers
– Canines 
– Technology 
• Security measures before and after attack
• NOTE:  Because accurate information is difficult to get, focus will be on 
more recent attacks and attacks in countries with more reliable public 
reporting.
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attacks against public surface transport, and it differentiates between different types of public 
surface transportation targets. It therefore enables reliable data analysis on all terrorist attacks 
against public surface transport and against subsectors within it.
Third, UMSTART’s data structure for targets and attacks is much less detailed than that in the MTI 
database. While UMSTART’s data elements for targets relevant to public surface transportation 
are limited to “transportation,” MTI divides its targets into 37 categories. UMSTART codes attacks 
into nine categories, whereas MTI codes them into 26 categories, including eight categories for 
further analysis of attacks using explosives or incendiaries. Again, this allows for detailed analysis 
of the frequency and lethality of attacks against various subtargets.
Fourth, UMSTART provides only generic descriptions of the bombs used in attacks, placing them 
in a single category, “explosives/bombs/dynamite.” In contrast, MTI lists the number of devices 
used in an attack and indicates whether the detonation took place above or below ground; more 
important, it provides subcategories for number of devices, type of explosive or incendiary (eight 
subcategories), how it was delivered or concealed (16 subcategories), and outcome of each 
device (seven subcategories). This allows MTI to provide critical analyses of the frequency and 
lethality of different combinations of bombs and incendiaries, delivered and concealed in different 
ways, against different targets. It also enables analysis of the frequency of use of single versus 
multiple devices, and how frequently they detonated on target, malfunctioned, or were rendered 
safe through Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). 
Finally, the MTI database allows for separate analysis of train derailment attacks, coding them 
into instances in which it is known or suspected that bombs were placed on the tracks, or known 
or suspected that bolts or tracks were removed, or other methods were used. As of December 17, 
2009, MTI’s database included more than 95 derailment events dating back to 1920. 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
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LIMITATIONS AND RELEvANCE Of ThE DATA  
TO U.S. PUBLIC BUS TRANSPORTATION
This section presents data on the frequency and lethality with which buses, bus stations, and bus 
stops are attacked. It is important to understand the preliminary nature of these data and also to 
place the attacks in context for U.S. stakeholders (see Figure 6).
DATA LIMITATIONS AND PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Information on some of the attacks in the database is limited, and much of it is unreliable. This is 
true for attacks that took place decades ago or as recently as 10 years ago. It is also true for some 
attacks that take place in developing countries or in countries without a tradition of open reporting 
by government agencies. Also, regardless of where attacks or attempted attacks take place, if they 
occur during a news cycle dominated by other events, the amount of information available from 
open sources can be surprisingly limited. Finally, some reporting by local press may be speculative, 
unverified, or editorial, and the cooperative exchange of information on surface transportation 
attacks between governmental authorities—relative to that in the world of commercial aviation—
appears to be only in its beginning stages.
For all these reasons, the MTI database entries assume certain default characteristics until more 
data are collected and verified. These “default entries” are recorded as rules in the database. For 
example: 
The default entry for a bomb that explodes inside a bus is “concealed or placed in the •	
passenger compartment.” This is a reasonable assumption, but in many cases there is 
insufficient data to verify that this was actually the case. Similar default entries are made 
for bombs that explode in bus stations and at bus stops: “concealed/left in stations (trash 
bins, under benches, near trains or buses)” and “concealed/left at bus stop.”
figure 6
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The default entry for bombs or incendiary devices that detonate is “detonated or released on •	
target.” This probably overstates, to some degree, the success of the attacks, particularly 
when casualties appear to be low, and it assumes precise knowledge of what the target 
was.
Armed assault is considered to be “assault with automatic weapons,” since in the absence •	
of information to the contrary, the prevalence of these weapons makes it likely that they 
were used.
“IED–unspecified” describes any bomb for which there is no information detailing how it was •	
constructed; and until more information is available on whether the targeted station was 
enclosed or open, it too is similarly categorized as “bus (or train) station, unspecified.”
Some default entries are fairly reliable. The method of delivery and concealment of weapons used 
in suicide attacks is coded as “carried on person” (although some vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) 
are driven by suicide bombers as well), and a grenade is assumed (with good reason, given the 
4 seconds between the pulling of a pin and detonation) to be “physically thrown,” unless there is 
information indicating that it was combined with other mechanisms as an IED.
Another important limitation of the database derives from the inability of the current data system 
to perform routine median calculations. Some of the averages (means) are actually based on 
only two or three attacks, and in a few cases, only one attack. To put these figures into context, 
we have included the actual numbers of attacks on nearly all charts that provide average lethality, 
and some basic information is provided to explain these events. In cases where there are few 
attacks and the lethality or the success of the attacks is particularly high, the average should 
therefore be seen as what terrorists were able to accomplish in a particular incident, not what they 
usually accomplish. 
MTI researchers will continue to capture attacks individually, and existing lists of data will be 
discovered and searched. MTI is, for example, now examining the extensive chronology maintained 
by the RAND Corporation and will incorporate new attacks gleaned from it into the database; 
questions about certain attacks will be answered, corrections will be made, and MTI’s new data 
platform will allow more powerful analyses. The results of our analyses of these attacks—unique 
as they are (no institution to MTI’s knowledge has attempted to generate such statistics)—must 
be seen as preliminary. They answer some long-standing questions, but they raise many others. 
Nevertheless, they serve an important purpose. They can help stakeholders—governments, 
transit managers, and employees—particularly in the United States, to focus on the ways the 
most frequent and/or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or 
mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States.
RELEvANCE TO ThE UNITED STATES Of ATTACKS ON  
TRANSPORTATION IN OThER COUNTRIES
Only three of the attacks in the MTI database were conducted in North America: two robberies 
in Mexico and a 1989 Greyhound bus hijacking in Canada, which was resolved peacefully. The 
overwhelming majority of the attacks have taken place elsewhere. It is important to understand 
the context of many of the attacks against public bus targets outside of the United States, 
because while these attacks are important, some have limited relevance to the domestic U.S. 
environment. 
First, most of the attacks have been part of essentially local guerrilla or terrorist campaigns 
designed to bring down a government or achieve independence, autonomy, separation, and/or 
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some kind of state governing the territory for which this independence, autonomy, or separation 
is sought. Public buses, bus stops, and bus stations have been routinely targeted by Hamas, 
Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and the robust collection of groups seeking a Palestinian state or the 
destruction of Israel; Sikh and Islamic separatists in India; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka, also known as the Tamil Tigers; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and the New People’s Army in Colombia; and the Moro National Liberation Front (MLF) in 
the Philippines. Yet the ideologies of these groups range from Islamism to Marxism, and the groups 
themselves can be religious (e.g., Hizballah and Hamas) or secular (e.g., LTTE and FARC).
Second, most of the attacks take place in countries in which public bus transportation is either the 
primary means of public transportation (e.g., in Israel) or, along with trains, a large part of it, and 
in rural areas, the only public transportation. This is far from the situation in the United States, 
where aviation is the primary method of long-haul transportation, and with the exception of high-
density urban centers such as New York, Boston, and San Francisco, the automobile is the primary 
method of local transportation. Where public bus transportation is extremely important, it becomes 
an obvious terrorist target. Conversely, where it is not so important, it may be a less likely target.
Finally, many of the tactics used in these attacks—some particularly lethal—are unlikely to be used 
in the United States. For example, Claymore mines were used exclusively in Sri Lanka and with 
particular effectiveness, and land mines have been used in rural areas of Latin America, Southeast 
Asia, and Southwest Asia. These weapons most likely become available to terrorist groups that are 
linked with active insurgencies, obtain military training, and have access to military equipment. In 
the United States, where military equipment is controlled but automatic weapons, including assault 
rifles, are widely available, it seems unlikely that military weapons would be used. 
Finally, in the United States, actual terrorist acts are dominated not by Islamic or Middle Eastern 
groups, but by groups or individuals energized by specific domestic issues. The terrorist attacks 
in the United States for the 10 years in which narrative descriptions are provided in UMSTART 
(January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2007) illustrate this point (Figure 7). 
figure 7
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With the exception of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001—which were conceived and 
orchestrated from outside the United States—U.S. “domestic terrorism” during this period has 
not been particularly successful. Although jihadist plots certainly have been aimed at producing 
high body counts, the 143 remaining attacks resulted in only 11 deaths and 51 injuries. Also, 
although those plots included public transportation targets—specifically, the heavy rail urban 
mass transportation systems of major U.S. cities—no attack against public transportation targets 
was recorded.3 Further, only one of the attacks could be considered “Middle Eastern.” It was 
conducted by a 70-year-old Palestinian male whose writings reveal a set of grievances that 
included not only Israel, but individuals who had cheated him out of funds and tourists in the 
Empire State Building. 
The greatest percentage of attacks (43 percent) involved extremist anti-abortion groups and 
individuals; 25 percent were conducted by the Earth Liberation Front and similar groups; and 16 
percent were conducted by the Animal Liberation Front. One attack was conducted by the Ku 
Klux Klan and a similar group, the Republic of Texas, and a smattering of single attacks were 
conducted by individuals or groups, most of them against government or corporate institutions for 
one cause or another. Finally, a large percentage of the attacks (16 percent) were conducted by 
unknown persons. 
Indeed, non-jihadist U.S. domestic terrorist groups have shown little inclination to cause civilian 
casualties, and most, in fact, have attempted to avoid them. This point is illustrated by Figures 
8 and 9, taken from a recent MTI report.4 Even the devastating 1995 Oklahoma City attack by 
Timothy McVeigh was aimed primarily at the U.S. government; McVeigh considered innocent 
civilians to be acceptable collateral damage.
Nevertheless, attacks that take place in other countries are relevant to the United States and to 
public bus transportation for several reasons.
figure 8
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figure 9
First, successful attacks against any target can be imitated. Terrorists seeking to attack public buses 
have an extensive playbook of attacks against public surface transportation. The description of 
successful results, particularly against very soft targets, simplifies the task for any terrorist seeking 
to make a similar attack and shortens the planning cycle. Attacks in London, Madrid, and Mumbai 
were considered major terrorist successes. Past success makes future attempts more likely.
Second, public bus transportation fits the profile of a desirable terrorist target. As described in 
the following excepts from a recent MTI report,5 terrorists are opportunists and are far more likely 
to attempt attacks that will, with high confidence, achieve a death toll of 25 to 50 than a risky, 
complicated operation that could kill 1,000 or more.
Forced to choose between undertaking a complex and demanding operation to 
cause massive death and destruction and executing a smaller-scale attack with 
certainty of success, terrorists seem generally to choose the latter. Terrorists may 
be willing to sacrifice their lives; they are far less willing to risk operational 
failure.
* * * *
Operational success tends to be defined in terms of casualties. Terrorists seek 
targets that have emotional or symbolic value—widely recognizable icons, targets 
whose destruction would significantly damage or disrupt the economy, and high 
body counts. In recent attacks, terrorists have been willing to forgo iconic value in 
favor of high body counts, for example, by bombing subways or commuter trains. 
The economic impact of such attacks is indirect.
* * * *
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The following assessment from the same report indicates the likelihood of al Qaeda or other 
jihadist groups targeting public transportation:
The threat posed by al Qaeda and groups associated with it is somewhat easier 
to analyze than that of other groups because al Qaeda’s declarations, plots, and 
attacks are fairly consistent and suggest a distinct prioritization of targets.
Al Qaeda urges its followers to carry out attacks that will produce high body counts 
and will have symbolic value—in jihadist language, attacks on targets that have 
“emotional” value (iconic targets)—and attacks that will cause serious economic 
damage. The iconic component can refer either to the destruction of an internationally 
recognized icon or to an iconic venue. In the latter case, the destruction of the 
target would not necessarily be the goal. The venue would merely be a dramatic 
backdrop that would increase the psychological impact of the attack.
In fact, however, few of the jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 have included iconic 
targets or venues, although diplomatic facilities and even nightclubs the jihadists 
consider sinful do have symbolic content. And despite the continued drumbeat 
about economic warfare in al Qaeda communications, the economic impact of the 
terrorist attacks since 9/11 has been incidental—for example, attacks on hotels do 
adversely impact tourism. 
Almost all of the jihadist attacks since 9/11 have been directed against soft 
targets—that is, unprotected or lightly protected targets such as hotels (Indonesia, 
Kenya, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan), restaurants and nightclubs (Indonesia, Morocco, 
United Kingdom), public surface transportation (Spain, United Kingdom, Philippines, 
India), residential compounds (Saudi Arabia), and high-profile individuals. Terrorist 
attacks on embassies, consulates, and commercial buildings (Indonesia, Pakistan, 
and Turkey) have used vehicle bombs on the street; in other words, they have 
not attempted to penetrate security. Only in a couple of instances have terrorists 
attacked government buildings or, in one case, a refinery (Saudi Arabia), which are 
likely to have higher levels of security. This again suggests a low tolerance for 
risk of failure. The detonation of the terrorist devices, even beyond any security 
perimeter, still resulted in casualties and destruction. The avoidance of security 
does not mean that the terrorists were averse to personal risk, since many of these 
were suicide attacks. We are talking about operational risks.
A review of the terrorist plots that were uncovered during the same period reveals 
greater operational ambition (use of exotic substances, multipart operations) to 
attack more-diverse but still similar targets. Most of the plots involved attacks 
on public surface transportation—the killing fields of terrorists bent upon 
slaughter. Embassies figured in several plots, along with other government 
buildings and military headquarters. Several plots involved attacks on naval or 
civilian vessels, like the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole or the French supertanker 
Limburg. However, soft targets predominate (emphasis added).
Third, until very recently, radical jihadist plots involving attacks inside the United States have been 
fairly amateurish, but four of them have in fact focused on public transportation. All four targeted 
heavy rail mass transit systems of major U.S. cities, however; none considered bus targets. 
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The 1997 flatbush plot.•	  In this plot, a suicide vest was prepared for use against the New 
York subway system. One conspirator hesitated, however, and approached the transit police. 
Authorities in turn conducted a raid and foiled the plot before it could be implemented. 
The 2003 New York poison gas plot. •	 In February 2003, a cell of terrorists were arrested 
on their way to Bahrain from Saudi Arabia. They had designed devices to be placed near 
air intakes in ventilation systems or in closed areas and had undertaken surveillance of the 
New York subway system in fall 2002. They requested permission from al Qaeda’s central 
leadership, but the decision was made to cancel the operation because the leadership had 
“something better in mind.” It is unclear what was meant by that comment. 
The 2004 herald Square plot.•	  In August 2004, two individuals, one born in the United 
States and the other a naturalized U.S. citizen, conspired to place a bomb in the Garden 
City subway station in New York City. Other targets in New York, particularly surface 
transportation targets, were discussed as well. A tip to the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) from an anonymous caller led the NYPD to pay an informant to work his way 
into the Islamic community (including mosques and book stores) to secure information 
about the plans of the conspirators. The informant taped conversations and provided key 
evidence. The NYPD also used an undercover officer and ended the plot before it could 
be put into operation. While the intelligence and emotional stability of the conspirators are 
questionable, the plot definitely included surveillance and operational planning. 
The 2006 PATh Tunnels plot.•	  In July 2006, FBI online surveillance uncovered a plot 
involving eight suspects, one of them (Assem Hammoud) an al Qaeda loyalist living in 
Lebanon, to blow up New York City PATH tunnels. Hammoud was released on bail after 
serving 26 months in solitary confinement in Lebanon. Two other individuals were also 
arrested, one in Canada and the other in the United Kingdom. According to the FBI, the plan 
was to carry bombs on backpacks onto commuter trains and detonate them while moving 
through tunnels. Dates and the amounts of explosives were discussed, and financing was 
apparently secured. The plot was uncovered before an overseas operative could go to the 
United States to undertake serious operational planning. The conspirators also spoke of 
bombing New York subways, among other targets. 
In addition, Bryant Neal Vinas, a U.S. citizen raised on Long Island who was captured by Pakistani 
authorities for taking part in al Qaeda operations in Pakistan, passed information to al Qaeda about 
the Long Island Rail Road system.
Fourth, the level of determination and sophistication of the plots, although still low in comparison 
with those originating and/or conducted outside the United States, seems to be increasing, as 
illustrated by the recent Zazi plot, in which Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty to planning to detonate 
bombs in the New York City subways; co-conspirators have also been charged.
Finally, while the pace of jihadist radicalization has been slower in the United States than in other 
countries such as the United Kingdom and France, domestic radicalization and recruitment and 
the plots that are sometimes involved appear to be increasing. Between September 12, 2001, and 
the end of 2009, 44 cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism were 
reported in the United States; 32 cases were reported between 2002 and 2008, an average of four 
a year. However, in 2009 there were 12 cases, a considerable increase.6 
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As Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano recently told Congress, “Home-based terrorism is here…. 
And like violent extremism abroad, it is now part of the threat picture that we must confront.” Since 
public transportation is in the terrorist playbook and has yielded many successes, attacks against 
the public transportation system in the United States must be considered. 
Is public bus transportation a potential target for jihadist plots inside the United States? Is it, 
relative to other targets, a likely one? Should we be concerned about public bus transportation 
and eager to protect it? It is hard to provide firm answers to these questions, but it is safe to say 
that a public bus, bus station, or bus stop in the United States is
A target containing a sufficient number of people to provide an adequate body count for a •	
potential terrorist.
A target that has been attacked repeatedly elsewhere with a high degree of success, •	
creating a kind of menu of successful and relatively simple attack methods.
A target that, although it has not yet appeared in jihadist plots to attack targets inside the •	
United States, can be an important part of an urban mass transit system that has been 
targeted and might reasonably appear on the radar screens of radical jihadist groups 
seeking an operational success, particularly if heavy rail mass transit targets become 
hardened in anticipation of attacks or in response to them.
Therefore, while it is important that governmental officials, public transit managers, and public 
transit employees consider the data in this report in context, it is also important that they not take 
false comfort in the lack of attacks in the United States. It would be prudent to learn from the 
attacks elsewhere and to develop a program of bus operator security-awareness training and 
corresponding procedures and equipment that mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks and also assist 
bus operators in dealing with the much more likely dangers they face from common crime and 
deranged individuals. 
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TRENDS IN ATTACKS ON PUBLIC BUS TRANSPORTATION 
OvERvIEW
Figures 10, 11, and 12 illustrate several fundamental points. Figure 10 demonstrates that while 
public surface transportation has been around for about 150 years, terrorist attacks against it have 
been a relatively recent phenomenon. MTI has recorded 15 attacks against surface transportation 
that occurred between 1920 and 1970, almost all of which were train bombings or attempted train 
derailments. Terrorist attacks started in earnest in about 1970 and then accelerated in the 1990s 
and the current decade. The drop in attacks in the past several years, as shown in Figure 10 and 
in Figures 11 and 12, is not an indication that the tempo of attacks has dropped, but rather reflects 
a lag in official reporting.
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the relationship between fatalities and attacks against bus targets 
and the relationship between injuries and attacks against bus targets, respectively. The spikes in 
attacks correspond relatively well to the spikes in fatalities and injuries. More attention should be 
paid to fatalities than to injuries, however, for several reasons. Reporting on fatalities is generally 
more accurate than reporting on injuries; open source reports often provide a firm number of 
fatalities, and “at least” a certain number of persons injured. The minimum number is recorded in 
the MTI database. Also, some injuries later become deaths. Finally, different countries may use 
different definitions of serious injuries and may record only those or all injuries. The bottom line is 
that death is easier to define.
figure 10
Surface Transportation Attacks: A Relatively 
Recent Problem
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figure 11
figure 12
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fREqUENCY AND LEThALITY Of ATTACKS ON BUSES AND TRAINS
We next examine how often, relative to other surface transportation targets, buses are attacked, 
first with all weapons and then with only explosive and incendiary devices. We then consider the 
relative lethality of the attacks.
Figures 13 through 16 place the passenger train target subcategories into three groups: passenger 
trains, train stations, and train tracks. Passenger trains include, for example, trolleys, subway 
trains, and intercity trains. Attacks on tracks are most often attempted derailments, and many, 
but not all, of these are aimed at passenger trains. The same general approach holds for buses. 
The eight bus target subcategories are grouped into buses (including passenger buses, minivans, 
school buses, and tour buses), bus stations, and bus stops. 
Two methods of looking at attacks are shown in the figures. “All attacks” include all 26 categories 
of attacks, ranging from IEDs to sabotage by derailment to assault with automatic weapons to 
kidnapping. “All bomb attacks” include only the eight categories of explosive and incendiary 
devices.
Figure 13 shows that 51.1 percent of the attacks in the database are against bus targets; 35.7 
percent are against trains; and 6.2 percent are against road targets—combining vehicle bridges, 
one tunnel, and highway and road targets. 
When only bomb attacks are considered (Figure 14), the percentages shift somewhat, in two 
ways. First, the percentage of attacks against bus targets decreases from nearly 51.1 percent to 
44 percent, and the percentage of attacks against train targets increases from 36 percent to 41 
percent. Second, the percentage of attacks against bus stops and stations increases, indicating 
another way in which bomb attacks tend to equalize the frequency with which target groups are 
hit. Buses are hit by explosive and incendiary devices about 32 percent of the time instead of 41 
percent, and bus stations and stops are hit roughly 12 percent of the time instead of 10 percent.
figure 13
How Often Do Buses, Bus Stations, and Bus 
Stops Get Attacked Compared to Trains and Other 
Targets?
Target # Attacks % of Total
Buses 615 41.55%
Passenger trains 289 19.53%
Bus stations/stops 142 9.59%
Train stations 153 10.34%
Railway tracks 87 5.88%
Vehicle bridge 58 3.92%
Highway or road 34 2.30%
Freight train 21 1.42%
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figure 14
The reasons for these shifts have yet to be studied in detail, and they are counter to what most 
would expect, perhaps because of the large number of publicized bombings of Israeli buses.
A word of caution is needed regarding these data. MTI may well find a set of passenger train 
attacks that are not yet entered. Two lists provided by DHS/TSA have been examined, and 
extensive RAND data will be examined, to identify any attacks on trains that MTI (along with the 
UMSTART system) may have missed. Previously published MTI chronologies generally found the 
ratio of bus to train attacks to be 1:1. Regardless of the final ratio, public bus service is clearly a 
major surface transportation target. 
Figures 15 and 16 show the lethality of attacks against these same target groups. 
When all attacks are considered, bus targets are attacked more often, but train targets are attacked 
with greater lethality. The average death toll of surface transportation attacks is four, which is 
also the average for buses, bus stations, and bus stops. The average number of deaths from 
attacks against passenger train targets, when only trains and train stations are considered (not 
all track attacks are designed to derail passenger trains—some are designed to create general 
disruption), is five. 
Considering only attacks in which bombs are used does not change the overall fatality rates of 
attacks against train and bus targets, nor does it change their relative differences (Figure 16). But 
bombs do increase the lethality of attacks against road targets—typically bridges and highways—
and they decrease the lethality of track attacks, showing the relatively higher lethality of attempts to 
derail trains mechanically (by removing bolts, tracks, etc.). Thus, bomb attacks have lower overall 
lethality, but only marginally. (MTI has just completed a detailed study of terrorist derailments, 
based on an analysis of 181 attempted derailments since 1920.7) The overall lethality of attacks 
not only does not increase, it decreases from four to three deaths per attack, on average, when 
only bomb attacks are considered.
Bomb Attacks Only
Target # Attacks % of Total
Buses 343 32.00%
Passenger trains 220 20.52%
Bus stations/stops 129 12.03%
Train stations 143 13.34%
Railway tracks 76 7.09%
Vehicle bridge 56 5.22%
Highway or road 25 2.33%
Freight train 0 0.00%
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figure 15
figure 16
All Attacks:  Lethality by Target Group
Target Group AverageFatalities
Average
Injuries
Trains and train stations 5 21
Bus, bus stops, and bus 
stations 4 10
Track 1 1
Road targets 0 0
Overall average 4 12
More attacks against bus targets, but train attacks more lethal
Bomb Attacks: Lethality by Target Group
Target Group Average Fatalities per Attack
Average Injuries 
per Attack
Trains and train 
stations 5 24
Buses, bus stops, 
and stations 4 13
Road targets 1 1
Track 0 1
Overall average 3 13
1. Bombs have little impact on differences between train and bus targets 
2. Road attacks increase in lethality (developing-country campaigns)
3. Track attacks:  Lack of mechanical derailments decrease lethality
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DISTRIBUTION Of ATTACKS BY REgION AND COUNTRY
The regions in which all attacks against buses occur most often are shown in Figure 17, along 
with the distribution among the various regions. The data generally reflect the focused and deadly 
terrorist campaigns that include bus targets in certain countries of these regions (which will 
become apparent in figures below). 
Nearly all (94 percent) of attacks against bus transportation have occurred outside of Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, Australasia, and North America, and all but three attacks took place 
outside of North America. In addition, with the important exceptions of Israel and the Russian 
Federation, most of these attacks have taken place in developing countries. 
When only attacks involving explosives and incendiaries are concerned, the regions in which 
the most attacks have occurred remain South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, with 
Southeast Asia having the next highest number. But then there are some interesting shifts, as 
shown in Figure 18.
Western Europe—which ranks seventh for all attacks—ranks fifth for bomb attacks, which reflects 
the extent to which explosives and incendiary devices dominate the relatively few attacks in the 
region, most of them from the Provisional, Real, and Continuity IRA, along with two 2005 al Qaeda 
attacks in London; the Madrid subway attacks; the ETA fire bombings of tour buses in France; and 
bus bombings and fire bombings in Greece. South America decreased from fourth to sixth, most 
likely reflecting the use of assault weapons and arson in Colombia. Finally, North America is in last 
place, with no cases of bus bombings. 
We turn now to the 10 developed and developing countries8 that lead in all bus attacks and all bus 
bomb attacks (Figures 19 and 20). 
figure 17
Where Do Most Bus Attacks Occur? 
Rank Region # % of Total
1 South Asia 230 29.95%
2 Middle East and North Africa 218 28.39%
3 Southeast Asia 91 11.85%
4 South America 50 6.51%
5 Sub-Saharan Africa 50 6.51%
6 Russia and the NIS 47 6.12%
7 Western Europe 26 3.39%
8 East Asia 21 2.73%
9 Eastern Europe 17 2.21%
10 Central America & Caribbean 13 1.69%
11 North America 3 0.39%
12 Central Asia 1 0.13%
13 Australasia & Oceania 1 0.13%
Total 768 100.00%
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figure 18
figure 19
Bus Bomb Attacks
Bomb
Rank
All Attack 
Rank Region # % of Total
1 2 South Asia 185 37.99%
2 1 Middle East and North Africa 147 30.18%
3 3 Southeast Asia 60 12.32%
4 5 Russia and the NIS 31 6.37%
5 7 Western Europe 17 3.49%
6 4 South America 17 3.49%
7 8 East Asia 16 3.29%
8 6 Sub-Saharan Africa 6 1.23%
8 9 Eastern Europe 4 0.82%
10 10 Central America & Caribbean 2 0.41%
11 12 Central Asia 1 0.21%
12 13 Australasia & Oceania 1 0.21%
13 11 North America 0 0.00%
Total 487 100.00%
All Bus Attacks – Leading Countries
Rank Developing # % of Total Rank Developed #
% of 
Total
1 Pakistan 70 9.21% 1 Israel 142 18.68%
2 India 88 11.58% 2 Russian Federation 37 4.87%
3 Philippines 72 9.47% 3 Greece 7 0.92%
4 Colombia 38 5.00% 4 United Kingdom 9 1.18%
5 Sri Lanka 36 4.74% 5 France 4 0.53%
6 Egypt 20 2.63% 6 Spain 3 0.39%
7 Turkey 24 3.16% 7 Japan 2 0.26%
8 Algeria 22 2.89% 8 Poland 2 0.26%
9 China 17 2.24% 9 Bosnia/Herzegovina 1 0.13%
10 Indonesia 13 1.71% 10 Canada 1 0.13%
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figure 20
For developing countries, the only significant shift in ranking (more than two positions) occurred 
as a result of the increase in bomb attacks in China and the decrease in Colombia and Egypt. For 
developed countries, the rankings shifted very little when there were more than three attacks. 
The lists of countries with the most attacks reflect the presence of terrorist campaigns that have 
included public bus transportation targets. While the largest single terrorist group listed in the 
MTI database is “unknown,” because of the lack of claims or suspicions confirmed by authorities, 
specific organizations and generic groups seem to be primarily responsible for attacks against 
bus targets in these countries. In developing countries, campaigns appear to be dominated by the 
following organizations and groups:
India.•	  Kashmiri and Sikh separatists, Naga and other tribal separatists, Islamic extremists 
and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), and Maoists. 
Pakistan•	 . Baloch Liberation Army, Islamic extremists and separatists, and, in earlier 
decades, Afghan government agents.
The Philippines•	 . MLF and the New People’s Army, particularly in Mindanao. 
Colombia•	 . FARC and the National Liberation Army.
Sri Lanka•	 . LTTE.
Turkey•	 . PKK (Kurdish separatists). 
Algeria.•	  The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Islamic extremists.
Egypt•	 . Al-Gamya and other Islamic extremists.
China•	 . Muslim separatists. 
Indonesia•	 . The Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
In the developed countries, the following organizations and groups—in addition to deranged 
individuals—are primarily responsible for attacks on public transportation: 
Bus Bomb Attacks – Leading Countries
Some changes in developing countries; no significant changes in 
developed countries
Rank Developing Country # % of Total Rank
Developed 
Country # % of Total
1 Pakistan 61 12.66% 1 Israel 107 22.20%
2 India 66 13.69% 2 Russian Federation 26 5.39%
3 Philippines 53 11.00% 3 United Kingdom 6 1.24%
4 Sri Lanka 33 6.85% 4 Greece 5 1.04%
5 China 15 3.11% 5 France 3 0.62%
6 Turkey 15 3.12% 6 Estonia 1 0.21%
7 Colombia 14 2.90% 7 Italy 1 0.21%
8 Egypt 8 1.66% 8 Sweden 1 0.21%
9 Algeria 10 2.07% 9
10 Indonesia 8 1.66% 10
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Israel and the West Bank and gaza Strip.•	  Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Jihad, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and its various factions, and the Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade. 
Russian federation.•	  Chechen separatists. 
The United Kingdom of great Britain and Northern Ireland.•	  The Provisional, Real, and 
Continuity IRA, al Qaeda-inspired conspiracies. 
greece.•	  ELA and other left-wing groups.
Spain, france, and Italy.•	  Basque separatists.
Poland.•	  Robbers. 
Estonia.•	  One bomber.
Japan.•	  Deranged individuals.
Canada.•	  A disturbed Lebanese Christian who hijacked a bus; the incident was resolved 
peacefully in front of Parliament Square in Ottawa. 
For U.S. stakeholders who have a tendency to see all terrorism as directed against Americans and 
their allies by “Middle Easterners,” these figures provide some interesting contrasts.
First, terrorist attacks take place in a number of Islamic countries, including Egypt, Algeria, 
Indonesia, and Pakistan.
Second, the ideological motivation of the attacking groups runs from religious (Hamas and Hizballah 
in Israel, LeT in Pakistan, and Al Qaeda), to groups advocating secular independence (LTTE in Sri 
Lanka, PKK in Turkey, Chechen fighters in the Russian Federation), to Marxist or left-wing groups 
(FARC and NLA in Colombia, MLF in the Philippines, and ELA in Greece). 
Third, if there is a common thread, it is the desire for some kind of local, regional, or national 
independence or autonomy. Although groups communicate, observe and imitate tactics, sometimes 
provide funding, and even form alliances (often uneasy), most terrorist campaigns, like politics and 
many wars, are local in their objectives and have to be understood locally, not simply with broad 
brushstrokes. 
Fourth, some of most bloody campaigns have been conducted outside of the Islamic orbit, most 
notably by LTTE in Sri Lanka. 
Thus, while terrorism against public transportation, including and perhaps especially bus 
transportation, has increased, this is the result of different campaigns, born out of different 
grievances. Nevertheless, the tactics are known, communicated, imitated, or improved upon as the 
general threshold against attacks involving innocent civilians erodes. It is alleged, for example, that 
LTTE in Sri Lanka, which may have observed Hamas’s first suicide car bombs during the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, invented the suicide belt and first used female suicide bombers, two 
tactics that were then adopted and enhanced by Hizballah, Hamas, and other groups in Israel, 
Gaza, and the West Bank.
 
DISTRIBUTION Of ATTACKS BY TARgET 
We next look at the various target categories for public bus transportation and consider how 
frequently each has been attacked since 1970. As shown in Figure 21, passenger buses—including 
minivan and minibus scheduled service—are the targets of roughly 80 percent of all the attacks, 
and bus stations and stops are the targets of about 20 percent. 
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figure 21
When only explosives and incendiary attacks are considered (Figure 22), the percentage of attacks 
against passenger buses decreases significantly, by 9.4 percent, to about 70.6 percent, and the 
percentage of attacks aimed at bus stations and stops increases significantly, from 20 percent to 
about 29.4 percent.
figure 22
All Bus Attacks – Targets
Subtarget # % of Total
Bus, scheduled 502 65.36%
Bus station – unspecified 109 14.19%
Bus, tourist 64 8.33%
Bus stop 44 5.73%
Minivan or minibus 34 4.43%
Bus, school 15 1.95%
Bus station – enclosed building 0 0.00%
Bus station – open air 0 0.00%
Total 768 100.00%
Bus Bomb Attacks – Targets
Subtarget # % of Total
Bus, scheduled 291 59.75%
Bus station – unspecified 104 21.36%
Bus stop 39 8.01%
Bus, tourist 26 5.34%
Minivan or minibus 18 3.70%
Bus, school 9 1.85%
Bus station – enclosed building 0 0.00%
Bus station – open air 0 0.00%
Total 487 100.00%
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In Figures 21 and 22, the terms “bus station—enclosed building” and “bus station—open air” are 
used only when there is enough information to determine that they are in fact enclosed or open 
air. If the type of station cannot be determined from the available evidence, the station is coded as 
“unspecified.” Since most of the attacks occur in developing countries, it is likely that the majority 
of the stations are open air.
DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE Of ATTACK AND WEAPON
Figures 23 and 24 illustrate how frequently various attacks and weapons are used against all 
passenger bus targets and all passenger train targets, respectively.
Figure 23 indicates that explosives dominate, with explosives and incendiary devices being used 
in 63 percent of the attacks since 1970; automatic weapons were used in about 11 percent, arson 
in 5 percent, and armed hijacking and robbery (combined) in 7 percent. Many of the “multiple 
attacks” involve a combination of explosives and sometimes incendiaries, followed by assault with 
automatic weapons. 
As shown in Figure 24, explosives dominate in attacks on passenger trains far more than they do 
in attacks on buses. Explosives and incendiary devices were used in 81 percent of the attacks on 
trains, in contrast to 63 percent of bus attacks. 
From the data in Figures 23 and 24, we can determine the relative distributions of explosive devices 
for attacks on buses and trains. The distributions are shown in Figures 25 and 26. (The category 
“IED–unspecified” is used not only for attacks with so-called homemade bombs, but also for attacks 
in which the details of the explosive charge are not known, and this percentage would probably 
decrease somewhat if better information were available.) 
For reasons discussed below, unspecified IEDs are used in 77 percent of the attacks against bus 
targets, as opposed to 90 percent of the attacks against train targets. The percentages also differ 
for attacks in which other devices are used: 
figure 23
How Are Buses Attacked?
Attack and Weapon # % of Total
IED – unspecified 373 48.57%
Assault with 
automatic weapons 132 17.19%
Arson 40 5.21%
IED - grenade 35 4.56%
IID (improvised 
incendiary device) 30 3.91%
Armed hijacking 27 3.52%
Robbery 25 3.26%
IED - mine 22 2.86%
VBIED 15 1.95%
Assault – other or 
unspecified 14 1.82%
Multiple weapons 13 1.69%
Attack and Weapon # % of Total
Kidnapping 12 1.56%
Assault with RPG 9 1.17%
IED – Dynamite 5 0.65%
IED – Claymore mine 6 0.78%
Other 4 0.52%
Mortar 2 0.26%
Sabotage, other 2 0.26%
Unknown 2 0.26%
Total 768 100.00%
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figure 24
figure 25
Grenades are more often tossed into buses than into trains (7.24 percent for buses, 1.1 •	
percent for trains).
Land mines are used more often on roads where buses travel, although they are also used •	
in train derailments (4.5 percent for buses, 2.5 percent for trains). 
How Are Trains Attacked? 
Attack and Weapon # % of Total
IED - unspecified 324 73.30%
Assault with automatic 
weapons 28 6.33%
Sabotage through derailing 15 3.39%
IID (improvised incendiary  
device) 10 2.26%
IED – mine 9 2.04%
Arson 8 1.81%
Multiple weapons 6 1.36%
IED – dynamite 6 1.36%
Assault – other or 
unspecified 6 1.36%
VBIED 5 1.13%
IED – grenade 4 .90%
Attack and Weapon # % of Total
Assault with RPG 4 0.90%
Armed hijacking 4 0.90%
Sabotage, other 4 0.90%
Robbery 3 0.68%
Other 3 0.68%
Threat, bomb 2 0.45%
Unconventional 
weapons 1 0.23%
Total 442 100.00%
Distribution of Devices Used Against Buses
Type # % of Total
IED – unspecified 373 76.9%
Grenade 35 7.2%
IIDs 30 6.2%
Mine 22 4.5%
VBIED 15 3.1%
Claymore mines 6 1.2%
Dynamite 5 1.0%
Total 485 100.0%
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figure 26
VBIEDs are used not only against bus stations and train stations, but also directly against •	
buses (3.1 percent for buses, 1.3 percent for train targets, exclusively train stations). 
Claymore mines (used in 1.2 percent of all bomb attacks against buses) have not been •	
used against trains and have been used almost exclusively against buses in Sri Lanka.
IIDs are used more frequently against buses than against trains (6.2 percent for buses, 2.7 •	
percent for trains). IIDs, often multiple devices, have been used in eight attacks against bus 
targets in Israel, six attacks in Turkey, three attacks in Egypt, and elsewhere, including two 
each in Bangladesh, Colombia, France, Greece, and Nepal. By contrast, IIDs (again, often 
multiple devices) have been used in four attacks against passenger train targets in the 
United Kingdom, one attack in India (the February 19, 2007, Peace Train firebombing that 
killed 68 people), and one each in Germany, France, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.
LEThALITY BY TARgET 
As shown in Figure 27, enclosed spaces such as scheduled buses (including minivans and 
minibuses) are, not surprisingly, where the most lethal attacks occur. Scheduled buses are the 
only targets in which lethality is above the average, but the lethality increase achieved by using 
bombs and incendiaries over that achieved by all weapons is not as great as might be expected: 
The average increase is one fatality for scheduled buses, and lethality is not affected or is even 
diminished in attacks against other targets. 
In Figures 27 and 28, as in nearly all lethality charts, the number of attacks conducted is specified 
to indicate how often targets are attacked, rather than how lethal the attacks are. The number of 
attacks also helps identify potential outliers—particularly deadly attacks that indicate what terrorists 
have achieved once or twice, not what they normally achieve.
Distribution of Devices Used Against Trains 
and Train Tracks
Type # %
IED – unspecified 323 89.97%
IID 10 2.79%
Mine 9 2.51%
Dynamite 6 1.67%
VBIED 5 1.13%
Grenade 4 1.11%
Total 357 100%
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figure 27
figure 28
Figure 28 indicates how much more lethal all attacks against trains are than all attacks against 
bus targets: Attacks on scheduled passenger trains have resulted in an average of six deaths, as 
opposed to five deaths per attack on scheduled buses, and an average of four deaths per attack 
on unspecified train stations, as opposed to an average of one death per attack on unspecified 
Lethality by Bus Target:  All Attacks and 
Bomb Attacks
Target # All AttackFatalities
All Attack
Injuries
#
Bomb 
Attack
Fatalities
Bomb
Attack
Injuries
Bus, scheduled 502 5 11 291 6 16
Minivan or minibus 34 3 5 18 3 7
Bus, school 15 2 10 9 2 13
Bus stop 44 2 13 39 2 14
Bus station –
unspecified 109 1 9 104 1
8
Bus, tourist 64 2 4 26 1 4
Overall average – 4 10 – 4 13
Average Lethality by Train Target:
All Attacks and Bomb Attacks
Target # Attacks All Attack Fatalities
All attack
Injuries # Attacks
Bomb 
Attack
Fatalities
Bomb 
Attack
Injuries
Passenger train 264 6 20 200 6 22
Subway train 15 5 44 15 5 44
Enclosed train station 15 3 37 12 7 74
Subway station –
unspecified 17 5 30 13 7 41
train station –
unspecified 107 4 22 101 4 19
Tourist train 5 2 11 1 8 40
Enclosed subway 
station 4 2 0 4 2 0
Station – train and bus 9 2 7 7 1 6
Trolley train 5 2 9 4 0 11
Total overall average – 6 22 – 5 24
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bus stations. This may be because more people gather at train stations than at bus stations in 
many areas. Certainly, these are significant differences that need to be explored.
With an important exception, when only bomb attacks are considered, the lethality for train targets 
shifts, but only slightly. The overall average—which for buses remains constant—decreases by 
one fatality. When the targets most often hit—passenger trains and train stations—are considered, 
lethality drops when bombs are used against passenger trains, but remains constant for train 
stations. However, it increases significantly when bombs are used against enclosed train stations 
and most subway stations. By contrast, lethality increases for passenger buses but remains 
constant for bus stations and stops.
LEThALITY BY ATTACK AND WEAPON 
Another way to look at lethality is to consider different types of attacks against particular targets. 
Figure 29 presents the lethality of all attacks against bus targets, showing the number of times 
each attack method has been used next to the average lethality. This leads to the following 
observations.
First, the two most lethal attack methods have been used infrequently. Claymore mines were 
particularly effective against buses in Sri Lanka, and the two attacks coded as “sabotage, other” 
include a deadly 1991 sabotage of a tourist bus in Greece in which the exact weapon was 
unspecified in open sources. The next most lethal attack methods include the use of VBIEDs 
against bus targets in Israel; attacks involving “other or unspecified” assault, which include the 
execution by firearms of bus passengers in Colombia, two 1996 attacks in Algeria in which 
passengers’ throats were slit, and a 1989 attack in Israel in which a bus was forced off the side 
of the road; and the use of mines in various countries, including a June 2005 attack in Nepal in 
which 53 people were killed and 73 were injured. Attacks with multiple weapons, which produced 
body counts similar to those of the most commonly used methods, often involved the use of an 
IED to stop a bus and automatic weapons to kill passengers.
figure 29
All Bus Attacks: Lethality by Attack and Weapon
Attack Type # Average Fatalities Average Injuries
IED – Claymore mine 6 21 28
Sabotage, other 2 18 4
VBIED 15 9 17
Assault – other or unspecified 14 8 3
IED – mine 22 7 15
Assault with automatic weapons 132 6 6
Multiple weapons 13 5 9
IED – unspecified 373 4 14
IED – grenade 35 2 12
IID 30 2 3
Assault with RPG 9 1 10
Mortar 2 1 5
IED – dynamite 5 1 2
Kidnapping 12 1 1
Armed hijacking 27 1 1
Robbery 25 1 1
Arson 40 0 1
Total – 4 10
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Second, the most lethal widely used attack method is assault with automatic weapons, which 
produced an average body count of six, and the ubiquitous unspecified IED, which produced an 
average body count of four. Not coincidentally, given that the majority of attacks are carried out 
with IEDs, this is the overall average for all attacks. The fact that automatic weapons are more 
lethal than IEDs is significant. 
All other attack methods, including IIDs and grenades, have less-than-average lethality. This is 
not surprising for some types of attack, such as robbery and kidnapping, which are not intended 
to kill passengers, and arson, which is usually against buses emptied of passengers.
There are some interesting similarities and contrasts to be drawn when the same data are 
generated for the lethality of attacks against all train targets (Figure 30). The average lethality 
when all attacks are considered is one fatality more than in bus attacks. 
Assaults with automatic weapons against trains also have a higher death toll than attacks with 
IEDs, topping the list of attack methods used. The lethality of derailments illustrates how deadly 
the mechanical sabotage of train tracks can be. Multiple weapons—again, often the use of a 
bomb to stop a train and assault weapons to kill passengers—have been a deadly combination. 
IIDs can be more lethal than IEDs, but the data primarily reflect the February 18, 2007, attack on 
the Peace Train in India. 
Interestingly, IEDs are somewhat more lethal against trains than against buses—a result that 
needs more exploration, particularly in view of the bus bombing campaigns in Israel. The rest of 
the results represent relatively few attacks, and some of the same observations that applied to 
buses—i.e., about armed hijacking, kidnapping, and arson—apply here as well. 
figure 30
All Train Attacks:  Lethality by Attack and Weapon
Attack Type # Fatalities Injuries
Assault with automatic weapons 28 12 21
Sabotage through derailing 15 10 21
Multiple weapons 6 9 7
IID (improvised incendiary device) 10 7 7
IED – unspecified 324 5 26
IED – mine 9 4 10
IED – dynamite 6 3 2
Assault with RPG 4 3 8
VBIED 5 1 6
Armed hijacking 4 1 1
Robbery 3 1 0
Assault – other or unspecified 6 0 9
IED – grenade 4 0 5
Sabotage, other 4 0 0
Arson 8 0 0
Total – 5 22
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
33
BOMBS AND BOMBERS
TYPES Of BOMBINg ATTACKS
Figure 31 illustrates two key aspects of attacks on surface transportation in which explosive and 
incendiary devices are used: whether single or multiple devices are used, and how many of the 
attacks are suicide operations.
The proportion of all attacks involving a single device is quite high—about 88 percent, which is 
slightly higher than the equivalent figure for trains (87 percent). It should be noted that some 
of the attacks involving multiple devices were aimed at the same target, indicating attempts at 
redundancy, and because of the way the data are entered in the database, a few are single-
device attacks against identical targets at the same time. Also, some of the multiple-device attacks 
were designed so that one or more devices detonated just as responders or explosives personnel 
arrived on the scene. 
Almost 12 percent of the attacks on buses were suicide attacks. The fact that there were 57 suicide 
operations and 57 of the attacks used multiple bombs is purely a coincidence 
SUICIDE BOMBERS
We next compared the percentages of all attacks, train attacks, and bus attacks that were suicide 
operations and the percentages of fatalities and injuries they generated. The results are shown in 
Figure 32. 
figure 31
The Bombs and Bombers
Single or Multiple # %  of Total
Single 430 88.30%
Multiple 57 11.70%
Total 487 100.00%
Type # %  of Total
Non-suicide 430 88.3%
Suicide 57 11.7%
Total 487 100%
Most attacks involve only a single bomb
Most but not all suicide attacks involve a single bomber and a single bomb
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figure 32
The percentages of all attacks against buses and all bomb attacks against buses that are suicide 
operations (nearly 7.5 percent of all attacks on buses and 12 percent of bomb attacks on buses) 
are roughly two and three times the percentages of attacks against trains that involve suicides 
(roughly 3 percent of all attacks on trains and 4 percent of all bomb attacks on trains). More 
striking, however, is the fact that suicide bombers create 13.7 percent of the fatalities in all attacks 
on buses and 21.5 percent of the fatalities in all bomb attacks on buses—twice their proportional 
share. The comparable figures for suicide train attacks are significantly less: 2.9 percent for all 
attacks and 3.21 percent for bomb attacks—less than their proportional share. Thus, suicide 
bombers are roughly five times more lethal when attacking bus targets than when attacking train 
targets. 
There may be several reasons for this. The use of suicide bombers against bus targets in Israel, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and India has been particularly lethal, and there are fewer passengers on 
buses and at bus stations than on trains. It is another trend that is worth exploring in more detail 
as more information on explosives and incendiary devices is collected. 
OUTCOMES Of BOMB ATTACKS
Figure 33 illustrates the “outcomes” of explosive and incendiary devices used in bus attacks. 
The majority (87 percent) of devices are presumed to have detonated or been released on 
target, considerably higher than the average for trains (74 percent). For bus targets, 82 percent 
of the devices were rendered safe, and 5.1 percent detonated early or away from the target 
or malfunctioned. These findings suggest—and are supported by case studies that will appear 
in the final report—that devices can be found and defused and passengers can be evacuated 
before an explosion when drivers, conductors, intelligence, police and security officials, and 
passengers are alert. In some instances, devices were also poorly designed. It appears that 
fatalism is not an appropriate response to explosive and incendiary devices used against public 
bus transportation.
What About Suicide Bombers?
Category # Suicide % Fatalities Suicide % Injuries Suicide %
All attacks
# % of Total Fatalities % of Total Injuries % of Total
# suicides 73 531 2,625
# of all attacks 1,481 4.93% 5,694 9.33% 17,807 14.74%
# of bomb attacks 1,253 5.83% 3,990 13.31% 15,516 16.92%
Train Attacks
# % of Total Fatalities % of Total Injuries % of Total
# suicides 14 69 720
# of all attacks 442 3.17% 2,400 2.88% 9,533 7.55%
# of bomb attacks 356 3.93% 1,824 3.78% 8,518 8.45%
Bus Attacks
# % of Total Fatalities % of Total Injuries % of Total
# suicides 57 414 1,885
# of all attacks 768 7.42% 3,024 13.69% 7,715 24.43%
# of bomb attacks 487 11.70% 1,946 21.47% 6,513 28.94%
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figure 33
LEThALITY Of BOMB ATTACKS
Finally, we look at the lethality of bomb attacks in three ways. First, we consider the lethality of the 
device used. Second, we examine the lethality of different methods of delivering and concealing 
explosive or incendiary devices. Third, having already examined the bus subtarget categories 
where all attacks occur, we look at these same categories for bomb attacks. We then combine 
these three factors—device, method of delivery and concealment, and target—to determine the 
most lethal combinations for bus attacks, and we compare the lethality of these combinations to 
the 12 most lethal attacks against all public surface transportation targets.
Figure 34 illustrates the lethality of devices used against bus transportation, showing again the 
number of times various devices were used.
The reasons for the high lethality of Claymore mines have already been described, but it is 
interesting to note that VBIEDS and land mines are more lethal than unspecified IEDs, which are 
at the average point, followed by grenades, IIDs, and dynamite
Figure 35 presents the comparable data for passenger train attacks. Once again, unspecified IEDs 
and dynamite are more lethal, on average, in train attacks than in bus attacks. Also, the figure for 
the lethality of IIDs is influenced by the February 2007 Peace Train attack in India. 
Figure 36 shows the average lethality of bus attacks by method of delivery and concealment of 
the device used, again indicating the number of times each method has been used. Concealing or 
placing the device in a non-passenger area is shown to be the most successful method. However, 
this finding is based on only two attacks, one in Sri Lanka in which there were no casualties and 
the 1996 attack in Pakistan that resulted in 40 fatalities. 
Bombs and Bombers (cont.)
Bombs appear to detonate on target and on time more 
frequently against buses (87%) than against trains (74%)
Outcome # % of Total
Detonated or released on 
target 422 86.65%
EOD successful – rendered 
safe 40 8.21%
Detonated early or away 
from target, or 
malfunctioned
23 4.72%
Unknown 2 0.41%
Total 487 100.00%
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
Bombs and Bombers36
figure 34
figure 35
Bus Bomb Attacks: Lethality by Device
Attack Type # Average Fatalities
Average
Injuries
IED – Claymore mine 6 24 28
VBIED 15 9 17
IED – mine 22 7 15
IED – unspecified 373 4 14
IED – grenade 35 2 12
IID (improvised incendiary 
device) 30 2 3
IED – dynamite 5 1 2
Overall average – bomb
attacks – 4 13
Train Bomb Attacks: Lethality by Device
Attack Type # Average Fatalities
Average 
Injuries
IID (improvised incendiary 
device) 10 7 7
IED – unspecified 323 5 26
IED – mine 9 4 10
IED – dynamite 6 3 2
VBIED 5 1 6
IED – grenade 4 0 3
Overall average – bomb 
attacks – 5 24
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figure 36
Most of the other concealment methods are used frequently enough to suggest valid averages, 
with the next most lethal method—“placed near the bus or other target, unspecified”—usually 
referring to VBIEDs, which can include suicide bombers. 
The third most lethal method, “carried on person,” refers exclusively to suicide bombers. As noted 
above, suicide attacks are particularly lethal in buses, achieving an average of seven deaths. The 
next most frequently used methods are concealing the device in a parcel or bag (five deaths) and 
concealing or leaving the device in the passenger compartment (four deaths, which is also the 
average lethality for all types of bomb attacks). 
Figure 37 shows the comparable data on concealment and method of delivery for attacks on 
passenger trains.
The average lethality achieved by suicide bombers in train attacks (five fatalities) is considerably 
lower than that achieved by the two most common methods of placing a bomb on a train—concealing 
it in parcels or bags (eight fatalities) or placing it in a passenger compartment (seven fatalities). The 
fatality rate of the most common method of attacking a train—placing a bomb on the tracks, on a 
bridge, or near a train9 (three fatalities) is considerably lower than the lethality of suicide bombers. 
However, these are preliminary findings that could change with further scrutiny.
Figures 38 and 39 show the lethality of attacks on various bus and train subtargets. The targets 
most frequently attacked are scheduled buses, passenger trains, bus stations, and train stations. 
These two figures show that bombs are, on average, considerably more lethal when used against 
train targets than against bus targets. For both sets of targets, devices are more lethal when 
released or detonated in enclosed spaces, starting with tourist trains (although our data come 
from only one attack), followed by enclosed train and subway stations, then scheduled buses and 
passenger trains, followed by subway trains and unspecified train stations, and finally by minivans 
and minibuses. All other targets yielded only two fatalities or less.
Bus Attacks: Average Lethality by Concealment and 
Delivery
Delivery and Concealment # Average Fatalities
Average 
Injuries
Concealed/placed in non-pax area 2 20 0
Placed near target 25 11 18
Carried on person 57 7 33
Placed on vehicle road 36 6 15
Concealed in parcel or bags 24 5 7
Concealed/left in pax compartment 196 4 12
Concealed in or on vehicle 1 2 2
Physical thrown 64 1 8
Concealed/left in stations 70 1 9
Unknown 4 1 6
Concealed/placed outside of stations 12 1 5
Concealed/left at bus stop 24 1 10
Overall average – 4 13
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figure 38
Train Bomb Attacks:  Average Lethality by 
Concealment and Delivery 
Delivery and Concealment # Average Fatalities
Average 
Injuries
Concealed in parcel or bags 39 8 73
Concealed/left in passenger compartments 143 7 27
Carried on person 16 5 51
Concealed/left in stations 84 4 16
Unknown 14 3 28
Placed on railroad track or bridge, or near a train 223 3 14
Placed near the target 8 1 10
Concealed/placed outside of stations 28 1 5
Concealed/placed in non-pax area 2 1 0
Physical thrown 7 0 5
Concealed in or on vehicle 1 0 3
Concealed/placed inside of building or office 3 0 0
Overall average – 5 24
Average Lethality by Bus Targets: Bomb 
Attacks
Bus Subtarget # Fatalities Injuries
Bus, scheduled 291 6 16
Minivan or minibus 18 3 7
Bus stop 39 2 14
Bus, school 9 2 13
Bus station – unspecified 104 1 8
Bus, tourist 26 1 4
Overall average 4 13
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figure 39
ThE MOST LEThAL COMBINATIONS Of DEvICES AND METhODS Of 
DELIvERY AND CONCEALMENT
For bus attacks, the small number of incidents that achieved greater average lethality than the 
most commonly used methods include
A 1996 attack in Pakistan (40 fatalities), in which a bomb was placed near the gasoline tank 1. 
of a bus.
Two attacks involving Claymore mines in Sri Lanka (21 and 20 fatalities), one against a 2. 
scheduled bus and the other against a government bus.
One 2007 suicide operation against a bus carrying police in Pakistan (18 fatalities).3. 
Two instances in which flammable devices ignited in passenger buses (perhaps accidentally) 4. 
in China in 1994 (an average of 14 fatalities). 
A motorcycle bomb in Sri Lanka used against a government bus (13 fatalities).5. 
Mines used once in Russia and twice in India against government buses (an average of 12 6. 
fatalities). 
All 12 of the most lethal combinations of devices and methods used in bus attacks are shown in 
Figure 40. The combinations used most frequently were VBIEDs against buses (17 fatalities in 
Israel), which included some suicides; the much more common use of IEDs carried on buses by 
suicide bombers (averaging nine fatalities) and left in parcels or bags (averaging eight fatalities); 
and land mines in several countries (averaging eight fatalities). One of the most common 
combinations—concealing an IED in the passenger compartment of a bus, of which there were 
Average Lethality by Train Target:  Bomb 
Attacks
Train Subtarget # Fatalities Injuries
Train, tourist 1 8 40
Train, passenger (intercity or commuter) 200 6 22
Train, subway 15 5 44
Train station – unspecified 101 5 23
Train station – enclosed building 12 3 43
Subway station – unspecified 12 2 7
Subway station – enclosed building 4 2 0
Station – train and bus 7 1 6
Train, trolley 4 0 11
Overall average 5 24
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slightly more than 140 instances—yielded an average of only four fatalities, less than half the 
lethality of suicide bombers carrying an IED and exactly half that of IEDs left in parcels or bags. 
The final report will address the lethality rates of various delivery/concealment methods when only 
bombs that detonated on target are considered. Since nearly all suicide bombers detonate on 
target, the difference in lethality between suicide and non-suicide operations may decrease. 
Again, all of these preliminary findings must be explored further.
Figure 41 shows the most lethal combinations for all attacks against public surface transportation. 
Eight of the 12 most lethal combinations were used in attacks on buses, and this does not include 
the 2007 suicide bombing of a truck convoy carrying Chinese workers, which we really consider 
an ersatz bus or minibus. 
The remaining three attacks involving train targets were
A 1989 train attack in China in which dynamite was hidden in a toilet (20 fatalities). 1. 
The detonation of four gasoline bombs (IIDs) on the Peace Train in India in 2007 (68 2. 
deaths and 50 injuries).
The placement of 19 bombs on the commuter rail system of Madrid on March 11, 2004 3. 
(191 deaths and 1,800 injuries). 
The most common combination of target, device, and concealment method—hiding an IED in the 
passenger compartment of a passenger train, which was used 103 times—achieved an average 
of eight fatalities, twice the fatality rate of placing an IED in the passenger compartment of a 
scheduled bus, the most common combination used in bus attacks. 
Bus Bomb Attacks: 12 Most Lethal 
Combinations
Average 
Fatalities # Target Device Delivery/Concealment
40 1 Scheduled bus IED - unspecified Concealed in non-pax areas
21 6 Scheduled bus IED – Claymore Placed near the target
20 1 Co. or gov’t bus IED- Claymore Placed near the target
18 1 Co. or gov’t bus IED - unspecified Carried on person
17 6 Scheduled bus VBIED Placed near the target
14 2 Scheduled bus IID Concealed in parcel or bags
13 1 Co. or gov’t bus IED – unspecified Concealed in or on vehicle       (motorcycle)
12 3 Co. or gov’t bus IED – mine Placed on vehicle road
9 41 Scheduled bus IED – unspecified Carried on person
8 11 Scheduled bus IED – unspecified Concealed in parcel or bags
8 20 Scheduled bus IED – mine Placed on vehicle road
8 2 Tourist bus IED – unspecified Placed on vehicle road
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All Bomb Attacks:  12 Most Lethal Combinations
Average
Fatalities # Target Device Delivery/Concealment
40 1 Scheduled bus IED – unspecified Concealed in non-pax areas
30 1 Truck (ersatz minibus) IED – unspecified Carried on person
21 6 Scheduled bus IED – Claymore Placed near the target
20 1 Co. or gov’t bus IED – Claymore Placed near the target
20 1 Passenger train IED – dynamite Concealed  in pax compartment
18 1 Co. or gov’t bus IED – unspecified Carried on person
17 4 Passenger train IID Concealed in pax compartment
17 6 Scheduled bus VBIED Placed near the target
14 2 Scheduled bus IID Concealed in parcel or bags
13 1 Co. or gov’t bus IED – unspecified Concealed in or on vehicle (motorcycle)
13 17 Passenger train IED – unspecified Concealed in parcel or bags
12 3 Co. or gov’t bus IED – mine Placed on vehicle road
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ThE fINAL MTI REPORT
Security measures that help alert security and intelligence officials, bus operators and managers, 
and passengers to suspicious behavior and devices can potentially increase the difficulty of 
mounting a successful attack or decrease the lethality of an attack that does occur. 
To help guide the development of such measures, the final report will use data from the most 
current version of the MTI database, which will prompt some changes in the empirical analysis. 
Also, to help determine what actions can be most effective in reducing risk, the final report will 
explore attacks in which
Particularly lethal tactics and weapons have been employed, including the use of suicide •	
attackers.
Actions by on-scene security personnel, operators, or passengers would likely not have •	
stopped or mitigated the attack without significant advance warning. 
Enhanced awareness and actions by security personnel, operators, or passengers did in •	
fact prevent or mitigate attacks.
Particularly lethal bombs or incendiary devices were used.•	
Bombs or incendiary devices malfunctioned or were ineffective.•	
Multiple bombs were involved, timed to detonate to increase casualties, especially among •	
emergency responders. 
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Agenda
• Overview of MTI interim data base
• All attacks against all public surface transport 
targets
• Bomb attacks against all public surface transport 
targets
• All Attacks against passenger train targets
• Bomb attacks against passenger train targets
• All Attacks against bus targets
• Bomb attacks against bus targets
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MTI Interim Data base
Overview
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Current Data
• New attacks captured since 9/01/09, mostly for buses 
and some for train stations:  
– 1,384 (1206) attacks on all public surface transport
– 438 ( 416) attacks against passenger trains/stations
– 354 ( 338) explosive attacks against passenger trains
– 684 ( 540) attacks against all buses
– 439 ( 336) explosives attacks against all buses   
• Time: 
– All Attacks:  January 1970 (July 1974) to Present
– Attempted Derailments – 1920 to Present (11 out of 91 occurred 
between 1920 and 1970)  
• Sources:
– 1920-2009:  Published MTI Chronologies and Updated Open 
Sources
– 1998-2007:  UMSTART accounts with narratives
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Recent and Planned Enhancements
• Recent:
– Added under 200 new attacks from terrorist campaigns against buses in 
Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Colombia, Thailand, 
the Philippines and Indonesia, and some train station and road attacks
– Focused road attacks on those clearly aimed at bridge and tunnel
destruction or road system disruption. 
• Underway: 
– Information from explosives communities on recent explosives attacks.
– Additional data fields (see next two slides) on 50 bus attacks (for bus 
operator project) train attacks; 50 train attacks will then be added.
– Moving to more stable and robust platform.
– More powerful system will enable multiple median calculations which 
will give a truer picture.
• WE ARE SEEKING YOUR SUGGESTIONS
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Some Current Fields
Targets (37 types):
• Bus (scheduled, school,  
tourist, government)
• Train (inter-city and commuter 
passenger, subway, Trolley, 
elevated, government, tourist)
• Train infrastructure:  Track, 
Bridge, Tunnel, 
Communications
• Stations (enclosed, open air) 
and bus stops
• Vehicle highway, road, bridge, 
tunnel
Weapon and Attack (26 types: 
• IED & IID
• VBIED
• Assault automatic weapons
• Assault with RPG
• Arson
• Sabotage by derailing, or other 
sabotage
• Robbery, Armed Hijacking and 
Kidnapping
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Some Current Fields for Explosives
Explosives
• IED Unspecified
• Mines & Claymore Mines
• Dynamite
• grenades
• vBIEDS
• IIDs
• Other
Location:
• Above or under ground
• In enclosed or open area
Outcome:
• Detonated or released on target
• Malfunctioned, detonated, released early 
or away from target
• failed to detonate or release
• Detonated during unsuccessful EOD
• Rendered Safe
Delivery and Concealment (16 types)
• On Person (Suicide)
• Left in bag or parcel in train or bus
• Left in station or bus stop
• Left outside station or bus stop
• Left in passenger compartment of train 
or bus
• Left in non-passenger compartment of 
train or bus
• Placed on tracks or near trains
• Placed near buses
• Physically thrown
• Other
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Some Future Data Fields 
• When attacks take place (peak versus off-peak)
• Size of cities in which attacks take place
• Type of train or bus, and type of service, and any other data on
environment in which bombs detonate
• IED details: Type and size of charge, type of detonator and timer 
• Success in detecting attack/device:
– Intelligence
– Security personnel
– Employees
– Passengers
– Canines 
– Technology 
• Security measures before and after attack
• NOTE:  Because accurate information is difficult to get, focus will be 
on more recent attacks, and attacks in countries with more reliable 
public reporting.
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All Attacks Against Public  
Surface Transport Targets
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Body Counts “Count”
• Terrorists seek slaughter; attacks with body counts of 50 to 
100 considered good returns on investment
• Substantial percentage of all attacks against surface transport 
designed to kill, not to cause economic harm:
– 39% of attacks resulted in at least 1 death
– 18% of attacks resulted in at least 5 deaths
– 10% of attacks resulted in at least 10 deaths
• Majority of recent attacks appear intended to kill
– Most of remaining 61% of attacks 
• failed or were stopped, or
• Aimed at disruption (often in areas of insurgency), especially 
against road targets (e.g., fARC and also IRA campaigns 
against tracks and roads)
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Surface Transportation Attacks: A Relatively 
Recent Problem
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What About Suicide Bombers?
Suicide %InjuriesSuicide %fatalitiesSuicide %#Category
30.88%610223.82%173412.47%441# of Bus Bomb Attacks
26.61%708115.57%26538.03%685# of Bus Attacks
188441355# of Suicides
Bus Attacks
9.27%77693.54%19513.95%354# of Train Bomb attacks
8.20%87842.73%25273.19%439# of Train Attacks
7206914# of Suicides
Train Attacks
18.33%1431913.54%39155.96%1191# of bomb attacks
16.01%163859.71%54605.13%1384# of all attacks
262453071# suicides
All attacks
Train attacks:  Small % of attacks and also proportional % of fatalities; 
Different Story for Bus attacks:  higher Percentage and more lethal attacks
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All Attacks - Distribution by Region
100.00%1384Total
0.22%3Central Asia
0.29%4Australasia & Oceania
1.01%14North America
1.16%16Central America & Caribbean
2.02%28Eastern Europe
2.24%31East Asia
4.05%56Sub-Saharan Africa
7.08%98South America
7.95%110Russia and the NIS
13.66%189Western Europe
10.77%149Southeast Asia
20.45%283Middle East and North Africa
29.12%403South Asia
%#Region
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All Bomb Attacks
100.0%1017Total
0.3%3Central Asia
0.4%4Australasia & Oceania
0.9%9North America
0.5%5Central America & Caribbean
1.2%12Eastern Europe
2.5%25East Asia
2.3%23Sub-Saharan Africa
5.5%56South America
8.9%91Russia and the NIS
15.0%153Western Europe
9.9%101Southeast Asia
20.0%203Middle East and North Africa
32.6%332South Asia
%#Region
Bombings dominate: No differences in distribution
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All Attacks: Leading Countries
0.58%8Japan101.37%19China10
0.51%7United States92.67%37Algeria9
0.65%9Italy82.46%34Egypt8
0.72%10greece73.03%42Thailand7
1.45%20germany63.97%55Sri Lanka6
1.88%26france54.34%60Colombia5
3.11%43Spain43.68%51Turkey4
4.84%67United Kingdom35.20%72Philippines3
6.79%94
Russian
federation29.10%126Pakistan2
10.12%140Israel114.60%202India1
% of total#Developed Rank% of total#DevelopingRank
With exception of Israel, developing countries suffer more
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Bomb attacks: Leading Countries
0.49%5Japan101.67%17China10
0.59%6United States92.27%23Algeria9
0.79%8Italy81.58%16Egypt8
0.79%8greece72.46%25Thailand7
1.08%11germany64.83%49Sri Lanka6
1.87%19france53.25%33Colombia5
3.15%32Spain43.74%38Turkey4
6.31%64United Kingdom35.22%53Philippines3
7.98%81Russian federation210.74%109Pakistan2
11.13%113Israel115.96%162India1
% of total#DevelopedRank% of total#DevelopingRank
Bombs Dominate:  No significant differences
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All Attacks:  Distribution by Target Groups
1.52%21Freight Train
2.02%28Highway or Road
4.05%56Vehicle Bridge
6.14%85Railway Tracks
10.19%141Bus stations/stops
10.98%152Train Stations
20.66%286Passenger Trains
39.23%543Buses
% of Total# AttacksTarget
1. Buses targets dominate:  49.42%
2. Passenger train targets (including track) follow:  37.41%
3. Road targets are last major group:   6.06% (mostly bridge attacks)
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All Bomb Attacks: Distribution by Target Group
0.00%0Freight Train
2.06%21Highway or Road
5.41%55Vehicle Bridge
7.28%74Railway Tracks
13.08%133Bus stations/stops
13.47%137Train Stations
21.34%217Passenger Trains
30.19%307Buses
% of Total# AttacksTarget
1. Rankings do not change and buses still dominate over trains, but
2. Bus stations and stops are roughly same as train stations and there are 
no attacks on freight trains
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Target Distribution for 1384 Attacks
1.88%26Minibus or Minivan
1.52%21Train, Subway
1.01%14Railway Bridge
1.30%18Subway station, unspecified
1.08%15Train, Freight
1.08%15Enclosed Train Station
2.02%28Highway or Road
2.38%33Bus, Company or Gov't
2.89%40Bus Stop
4.05%56Bus, Tourist
4.05%56Vehicle Bridge
6.14%85Railway Tracks
7.30%101Bus Station – Unspecified
7.66%106Train Station, Unspecified
18.86%261Train, Passenger 
32.30%447Bus, Scheduled
%#TARGET %#TARGET
0.07%1Enclosed Bus Station 
0.00%0
Transport  Office Multiple 
targets, Open Air Bus, 
Subway, Train Stations, 
Elevated trains, Overpasses
0.07%1Railway-Unspecified
0.07%1Train, Troop
0.07%1Railway Tunnel
0.14%2Vehicle Tunnel
0.22%3Railway Signals/ Comm System
0.29%4Enclosed Subway Station 
0.65%9Station -- Train and Bus
0.51%7Train, Tourist 
0.36%5Other
0.36%5Train, Trolley
0.72%10Truck
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Target Distribution for 1017 Bomb Attacks
1.5%15train, subway
1.8%18Minivan or Minibus
2.0%20Train, Freight
2.1%21Highway or Road
2.1%21Bus, Tourist (9th - was 7th)
2.3%23Bus, Company or Gov't
3.6%37Bus Stop 
5.4%55Vehicle Bridge
7.3%74Railway Tracks
9.4%96Bus Station – Unspecified
9.8%100train station, unspecified
19.4%197Passenger Trains
25.6%260Bus, Scheduled
%# Target %# Target
0.1%1
Multiple Targets, Tourist Train 
(had 7), Troop Train, Vehicle 
Tunnel, Unspecified Railway: 
0.1%0Enclosed and Open Bus station 
0.2%2Transport Company Office
0.2%2Railway Signals/Comm System
0.4%4Other
0.4%4Train, Trolley
0.4%4Enclosed Subway Station 
0.5%5Truck
0.7%7Station -- Train and Bus
0.8%8Bus, School
1.3%13Subway station, unspecified
1.3%13Railway Bridge
1.3%13Enclosed Train Station (14th was 12th)
few Significant Differences: See below when rank is off by more than 
one place 
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All Attacks:  Lethality by Target Group:
00Road Targets
11Track
104Overall Average
104Bus, Bus Stops and Bus stations
206Trains and Train Stations
Average
Injuries
Average
FatalitiesTarget Group
More attacks against bus targets, but train attacks more Lethal
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Bomb Attacks: Lethality By Target Group
10Track
124Overall Average
01Road
134Bus
195Train
Average Injuries 
per Explosion
Average  Fatalities 
per ExplosionTarget Group
1. Bombs Equalize:  Differences between train and bus targets decrease
2. Road Attacks increase in lethality (developing country campaigns).
3. Track attacks:  Lack of mechanical derailments decrease lethality.
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All Attacks:  Lethality By Target
142Bus Stop
53Train, Freight
13Enclosed Subway Station
104Bus, School
305train station, unspecified
125Co & Gov’t bus
445Subway station,  unspecified
35Bus, Scheduled
115train, subway
646Enclosed Train Station
207Passenger train
Average 
Injuries
Average 
DeathsTarget
00
Railway Tracks, Enclosed & Open 
Air  Bus Stations, Train and Bus 
Stations, Multiple Targets, 
Railway Bridges and Tunnels, 
Trolley, Troop Trains, Transport 
Company Office, Railway 
Signals/Comm System
104Overall Average
11Vehicle Bridge
31Bus Station - Unspecified
91Truck
02Train, Tourist
42Highway or Road
72Other
102Minivan or Minibus
112Bus, Tourist
Trains, stations and then buses most lethal targets
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Bomb Attacks:  Lethality By Target (per explosion):
62Minivan or Minibus
153Bus, School
13Truck (often ersatz bus)
114train station, unspecified
395train, subway
185Passenger Train 
125Bus, Company or Gov't
545Enclosed Train Station
165Bus, Scheduled
386Subway station, unspecified
408Tourist Train ( Very Few) 
Average
Injuries
Average
FatalitiesTarget
110Train, Trolley
Average 
Injuries
Average 
FatalitiesTarget
124Overall Average 
21Bus, Tourist
51Station -- Train and Bus
11Highway or Road
81Bus Station unspecified
31Train, Freight
142Bus Stop
02Other
02Enclosed Subway Station
Bombs equalize: Buses, trains and train stations become equally lethal 
targets
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Distribution By Attack and Weapon
1.45%20Sabotage through Derailing
1.95%27VBIED
2.60%36IED - Grenade
1.45%20IED - Dynamite
1.37%19Assault- Other or Unspecified
2.02%28Robbery
2.24%31Armed Hijacking
2.75%38IED - Mine
3.04%42IID (Improvised Incendiary Device)
3.90%54Arson
10.77%149Assault with Automatic Weapons
61.17%846IED - unspecified
%#Attack and Weapon
(1) Explosives and incendiaries (73% of total) & automatic weapons  (10.77%) 
dominate; (2) hijacking and Robbery still important; (3) Mechanical derailments 
are effective
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Distribution by Attack and Weapon (con’t)
100.00%1383TOTAL
0.22%3Threat, Bomb
0.00%0Sniper or other stand-off attacks
0.07%1Unconventional weapons
0.14%2Mortar
0.07%1IED - Other
0.22%3Unknown
0.58%8Other
0.43%6IED - Claymore Mine
0.72%10Kidnapping
0.94%13Multiple Weapons
0.94%13Assault with RPG
0.94%13Sabotage, Other
%#Attack and Weapon
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All Attacks: Lethality by Attack and Weapon
154IED - unspecified
13Sabotage, Other
34IID (Improvised Incendiary Device)
105IED - Mine
115VBIED
86Multiple Weapons
56Assault- Other or Unspecified
97Assault with Automatic Weapons
168Sabotage through Derailing
2423IED - Claymore Mine
Average
Injuries
Average 
FatalitiesAttack and Weapon
(1) Some weapons are local (claymores) or few (Other assault); (2) Suicide 
bombers cause 7.07 deaths and 34.99 injuries -- overall deaths are closed to 
automatic weapons assaults; (3) Mechanical derailments can be deadly
51Mortar
122IED - Grenade
Average
Injuries
Average 
FatalitiesAttack and Weapon
124Overall Average
00IED - Other
10Arson
11Robbery
11Armed Hijacking
11IED - Dynamite
11Kidnapping
41Other
92Assault with RPG
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Bomb Attacks Against All Public 
Surface Transport Targets
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Single or Multiple Bombs
100.0%1017Total  Attacks
13.8%140Multiple Bomb Attacks
86.2%877Single Bomb Attacks
%#Number of Bombs
86% are single bomb attacks; No trends over time
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Outcome of All Bomb Attacks
100.00%1191Total
0.34%4Detonated during unsuccessful EOD
0.84%10Unknown
1.76%21failed to Detonate or Release
5.21%62
Detonated Early or Away from Target, or 
Malfunctioned
14.53%173EOD successful - rendered safe
77.33%921Detonated or released on Target
%#Bomb Results
77% On Target, 14.5% Detected and rendered safe, 7% didn’t 
work as planned
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Lethality by Target per Explosion
142Bus Stop
13Other
53Minivan or Minibus
104Bus, Company or gov't
125train station, unspecified
35Truck (ersatz bus)
305Subway station, unspecified
115Bus, Scheduled
445Subway Train
646Enclosed Train Station
207Passenger Train
InjuriesDeathsTarget
91Bus Station -Unspecified
42Bus, Tourist
72Station -- Train and Bus
112Train, Tourist
11highway or Road
InjuriesDeathsTarget
123Overall Average
31Train, freight
02Enclosed Subway Station -
102Bus, School
Trains, Subways, Buses and Enclosed Train and Subway
Stations Dominate
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Lethality Per Device by Explosion:
123Overall Average
00IED - Other
11IED - Dynamite
102IED - grenade
133IED - unspecified
34IID (Improvised Incendiary Device)
84IED - Mine
105vBIED
Average # of Injuries 
per Explosion
Average # Fatalities 
per ExplosionDevice
vBIEDs, Mines and IIDs More Lethal than Average
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Lethality Per Explosion by Delivery/Concealment
12.213.34Overall Average
2.780.51Concealed/placed outside of Stations
6.600.67Physical Thrown
10.650.90Concealed/left at Bus Stop
4.451.06Placed on Railroad track or bridge, or near a train
10.701.70Concealed in or on Vehicle
10.002.14Unknown
4.562.83Placed on Vehicle Road, Bridge or in Tunnel
7.293.45Concealed/left in Stations (Trash bins, Under benches, near trains or buses)
31.354.84Concealed in Parcel or Bags
12.264.87Placed near the bus or other target - unspecified
16.634.98Concealed/Left in Passenger Compartments
34.997.07Carried on Person
0.0010.50Concealed/placed in non-passenger areas
Average Injuries Average Fatalities Delivery/Concealment
Suicide attacks account for only 5.13% of bomb attacks and 9.71% of all deaths 
and are lethal…. But not the most lethal method of delivering a bomb
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All Bomb Attacks:  Most Lethal Combinations
Placed Near Bus or TargetvBIED Bus, Scheduled17
Concealed in Parcel or BagIIDBus, Scheduled14
Carried on PersonIED unspecifiedCo or gov’t Bus18
Left in Passenger  
compartmentIED DynamitePassenger Train20
Physically ThrownIED grenadeBus, Scheduled30
Carried on PersonIED unspecifiedTruck (ersatz Minivan)30
Concealed in Parcel or BagIED unspecifiedEnclosed Train Station31
Left in Passenger 
CompartmentIIDPassenger Train34
Concealed in Parcel or BagIED -UnspecifiedSubway Station35
Placed in non-Passenger areaIED UnspecifiedBus, Scheduled40
Delivery/ConcealmentDeviceTargetAvg. fatalities
(1) Buses, Trains and enclosed stations dominate (2) vBIEDS and IIDs can be 
lethal; (3) Suicides not most deadly.
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Attacks and Fatalities Over Time
Notice Spikes in fatalities; normally but not always 
coincide with spikes in attacks
Attacks and fatalities
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Attacks and Injuries over time
Injuries fluctuate less, with one major spike in 2005 (Reporting
on Injuries is probably less accurate)
Attacks and Injuries
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All Attacks Against 
Passenger Train Targets
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Body Counts Count
• True also for passenger trains; but % of attacks with highest death 
rates is greater: 
– 35% (vice 29%) of attacks resulted in at least 1 death
– 20% (vice 21%) of attacks resulted in at least 5 death
– 12% (vice 10%) of attacks resulted in at least 10 deaths 
– Most of the remaining 65% failed or were stopped
– Some railway bridge or track bombings in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and 
some (IRA) in UK appear designed to disrupt rail systems
• Average deaths and injuries per bomb against passenger rail targets 
are 5.5 and 21.9; however, 66% of bomb attacks failed and resulted in 
no casualties
• Some of the most deadly bomb attacks have yielded an average body 
count of 24 per bomb
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Where:  Train Attacks By Region
• Trains a major target but not yet in North America
• Top 5 Regions & North America: 
– South Asia: 135 (30.75%)
– Western Europe: 114 (25.97%)
– Middle East & North Africa:  49 (11.16%)
– Russia and the NIS 47 (10.71%)
– Southeast Asia:  31 (  7.06%)
– North America:  (9th) 7   (1.59%)
• Regional distribution was somewhat different for all attacks 
– Middle East and North Africa was 2nd region (20.45%) 
– Southeast Asia was 3rd region (10.77%)
– Western Europe was 4th region (13.66%)
– North America was in 11th position for all attacks
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How: All Attacks and Train Attacks
• All Attacks: Explosives and incendiaries dominate.  Automatic weapons, 
and fire are used next. Top 5
– IEDs, IIDs & 17 vBIEDS: 73.00%
– Automatic Weapons: 10.77%
– Arson: 3.90%
– Armed hijacking 2.24%
– Robbery 2.02%
• Passenger Train Attacks:  Explosives really dominate; followed by 
automatic weapons, mechanical derailing, and then fire. Top five:
– IEDs & 4 vBIEDS: 78.50% 
– Automatic Weapons: 6.38%
– Mechanical derailing: 3.42%
– IIDs: 2.51%
– Arson: 1.82%
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What:  Passenger Trains
• Top targets for attacks against passenger trains:
– Train (Intercity or Commuter):  261 (59.51%)
– Train Stations:   130 (29.68%)
– Subway Stations: 19 (  5.02%)
– Subway Trains: 15 (  3.42%)
– Tourist Trains: 5 (  1.14%)
– Trolleys: 5 (  1.14%)
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Most Lethal Train Targets
• NOTE: Enclosed locations most lethal: Trains and some stations
20.05.8Total Overall Average
9.10.0Train, Trolley
6.81.6Station -- Train and Bus
0.02.0Subway Station - Enclosed Building
11.42.0Train, Tourist
11.74.7train station, unspecified
29.74.9Subway station, unspecified
44.35.3train, subway
64.36.4Train Station, Enclosed Building
20.06.7Train, Passenger (Intercity or Commuter)
Average 
Injuries
Average 
fatalitiesTrain Sub-Target
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Bomb Attacks Against 
Passenger Train Targets
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Passenger Train Attacks using Explosives:  
The Bombs and Bombers
• Suicide bombers may not be our biggest problem:  Suicides 
constitute a small percentage of attacks, even fewer than for all 
attacks against surface transport
– 5.13% of all attacks  
– 3.19% of all attacks on trains  
– 3.95% of all explosive attacks on trains
• for all attacks, they cause a disproportionate percentage of 
casualties; but for attacks on trains, and explosives attacks on
trains, fatalities are roughly proportional to attacks.
– 9.71% of all fatalities and 16.01% of all injuries for all attacks 
– 2.73% of all fatalities and 8.20% of all injuries for all attacks on 
trains 
– 3.54% of all fatalities and 9.27% of all injuries for train attacks 
using explosives
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The Bombs and Bombers (con’t)
• In train attacks, suicide not as lethal as other methods of 
delivery, yielding 3 fewer fatalities on average than next most 
lethal methods (see slide 48)
• Number of bombs used:
– Only 12.7% of attacks used more than 1 device
– No discernable trends over time
• Successful Bombs:
– 74.08% of bombs successful
– 14.93% percent found – EOD successful
– 6.48% detonated early, or away from primary target
– 1.97% failed to detonate
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What:  Train Targets
100.00%354Total
0.28%1Train, Tourist
1.13%4Train, Trolley
1.13%4Subway Station - Enclosed Building
1.98%7Station -- Train and Bus
3.67%13Train Station, Enclosed Building
3.67%13Subway station, unspecified
4.24%15Train, subway
28.25%100Train station, unspecified
55.65%197Train, Passenger (Intercity or Commuter)
%#Sub-target
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All Attacks: Lethality Per Explosion by Delivery/Concealment
12.213.34Overall Average
2.780.51Concealed/placed outside of Stations
6.600.67Physical Thrown
10.650.90Concealed/left at Bus Stop
4.451.06Placed on Railroad track or bridge, or near a train
10.701.70Concealed in or on Vehicle
10.002.14Unknown
4.562.83Placed on Vehicle Road, Bridge or in Tunnel
7.293.45Concealed/left in Stations (Trash bins, Under benches, near trains or buses)
31.354.84Concealed in Parcel or Bags
12.264.87Placed near the bus or other target - unspecified
16.634.98Concealed/Left in Passenger Compartments
34.997.07Carried on Person
0.0010.50Concealed/placed in non-passenger areas
Average Injuries Average Fatalities Delivery/Concealment
Suicide attacks constitute only 5.96% of train bomb attacks, are
lethal, but not ThE most lethal method of delivering a bomb
Not to be distributed Further 
without MTI/NTSC Permission
Mineta Transportation Institute
National Transportation Security Center
November 12, 2009  p 51
Delivery/Concealment – Significant differences 
Overall Average
30Concealed in or on vehicle
50Physical Thrown
101Placed near the bus or other target -unspecified
51Placed outside of Stations
01Placed in non-passenger areas
133Placed on Railroad track or bridge, or near a train
515Carried on Person (was 2nd, now 4th)
76Concealed/left in Stations (now 3
rd,was 
6th)
708Concealed in Parcel or Bags (was 5
th, 
now 2nd)
278Concealed/Left in Passenger Compartments  (was 3rd, now 1st)
Average
Injuries
Average
fatalitiesDelivery and Concealment
Suicides relatively less lethal in trains
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Most Lethal Combinations: Trains
Concealed in Parcel or BagsIED  unspecifiedEnclosed Train Station31
Placed on Track or BridgeIED - MinePassenger Train7
Placed on Track or BridgeIED unspecifiedTourist Train8
Left in Passenger CompartmentIED unspecifiedPassenger Train8
Left in StationIED unspecifiedTrain Station8
Carried on PersonIED unspecifiedSubway Station11
Carried on PersonIED unspecifiedSubway Train13
Concealed in Parcel or BagsIED - DynamitePassenger Train20
Concealed/left in Passenger 
CompartmentIIDPassenger Train34
Concealed in Parcel or BagsIED unspecifiedSubway Station35
Delivery/ConcealmentDeviceTargetAveragefatalities
Not to be distributed Further 
without MTI/NTSC Permission
Mineta Transportation Institute
National Transportation Security Center
November 12, 2009  p 53
Explosives Train Attacks & Fatalities Over Time
Attacks and fatalities
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Explosives Train Attacks & Injuries Over Time
Attacks and Injuries
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All Attacks Against Buses
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685 Bus Attacks: By Region
100.00%685Total
0.15%1Australasia & Oceania
0.15%1Central Asia
0.44%3North America
1.90%13Central America & Caribbean
2.04%14Eastern Europe
3.07%21East Asia
3.65%25Western Europe
4.38%30Sub-Saharan Africa
6.72%46Russia and the NIS
6.72%46South America
12.41%85Southeast Asia
28.61%196South Asia
29.78%204Middle East and North Africa
% of total#Region
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441 Bus Bomb Attacks: Regions Shift
100.00%441Total
0.00%0North America was 11th with 3 attacks)(
0.23%1Australasia & Oceania
0.23%1Eastern Europe
0.23%1Central Asia
0.45%2Central America & Caribbean
1.13%5Sub-Saharan Africa (was 6th)
3.63%16South America (was 4th)
6.80%30Russia and the NIS (was 5th)
3.63%16East Asia (was 8th)
3.85%17Western Europe (was 7th)
12.70%56Southeast Asia
31.75%140Middle East and North Africa (was 1st)
35.37%156South Asia ( Was 2nd)
% of total#Region
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All Bus Attacks: Leading Countries
0.15%1Canada101.90%13Indonesia10
0.15%1Bosnia/herzegovina92.48%17China9
0.29%2Poland82.92%20Egypt8
0.29%2Japan73.21%22Algeria7
0.44%3Spain63.21%22Turkey6
0.58%4france54.96%34Sri Lanka5
1.02%7greece34.96%34Colombia4
1.17%8United Kingdom48.61%59Philippines3
5.26%36Russian federation29.64%66Pakistan2
18.83%129Israel111.82%81India1
% of total#Developed CountryRank% of total#
Developing
CountryRank
Developing countries suffer more; Major campaigns in developed 
countries are Israel (current) and UK (mostly past - IRA)
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Bus Bomb Attacks – Leading Countries
101.81%8Indonesia10
91.81%8Egypt9
0.23%1Sweden82.27%10Algeria8
0.23%1Italy72.95%13Colombia 7 (4)
0.23%1Estonia62.95%13Turkey6
0.68%3france53.40%15China5 (9)
1.13%5greece47.03%31Sri Lanka4
1.36%6United Kingdom39.52%42Philippines3
5.67%25Russian federation212.93%57Pakistan2
23.13%102Israel113.61%60India1
% of total#DevelopedCountryRank% of total#
Developing 
CountryRank
Some changes in developing countries; no significant changes in 
developed countries
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All Bus Attacks:  How?
2.05%14VBIED
2.34%16IED - Mine
1.90%13Assault- Other or Unspecified
4.24%29IED - Grenade
3.36%23Robbery
4.09%28IID (Improvised Incendiary Device)
3.95%27Armed Hijacking
5.70%39Arson
15.94%109Assault with Automatic Weapons
50.15%343IED - unspecified
%#Attack and Weapon %#Attack and Weapon
1.32%9Assault with RPG
1.32%9Kidnapping
100.00%684Total
0.29%2Unknown
0.29%2Sabotage, Other
0.58%4Other
0.29%2Mortar
0.73%5Multiple Weapons
0.73%5IED - Claymore Mine
0.73%5IED - Dynamite
Bombs Predominate (60.23%) -- followed by automatic weapons 
(16%) fire - Arson and IIDs - (10%); hijacking (3.95%) -- but  bombs 
dominate less so than for all Attacks (73%) and trains (78.5%)
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All Bus Attacks: Targets
100.00%684Total
0.00%0Bus Station - Open Air
0.00%0Bus Station - Enclosed Building
2.05%14Bus, School
3.80%26Minivan or Minibus
5.85%40Bus Stop
8.19%56Bus, Tourist
14.77%101Bus Station - Unspecified
65.35%447Bus, Scheduled
%#Sub-Target
Scheduled buses and bus stations predominate, followed by 
tourist buses and bus stops
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Bus Bomb Attacks:  Targets
Note:  Somewhat smaller % of attacks against scheduled buses 
(65.35%) and tourist buses (8.19%) than for all bus attacks; and
higher %  against stations and stops (14.11% and 5.85%)
100.00%441Total
0.00%0Bus Station - Open Air
0.00%0Enclosed Bus Station 
1.81%8Bus, School
4.08%18Minivan or Minibus
4.76%21Bus, Tourist
8.39%37Bus Stop
21.77%96Bus Station - Unspecified
59.18%261Bus, Scheduled
% of total#Sub Target
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Bomb Attacks Against Buses
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The Bombs and Bombers
100%441Total
12.47%55Suicide
87.53%386Non-Suicide 
% of total#Type
The % of suicides is considerably higher than in all bomb attacks 
(5.96%) and much higher than in bomb attacks against trains  (3.95%):  
Most likely attributed to suicide campaigns in Israel, Sri Lanka and 
Russia
100.00%441Total
11.34%50Multiple
88.21%389Single
%  of total#Single or Multiple
The % of single bombs are about the same as for all bomb attacks
and all train bomb attacks
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Bombs and Bombers (con’t)
100.00%441Total
3.17%14
Detonated Early or Away from 
Target, or Malfunctioned
8.62%38EOD successful - rendered safe
88.21%389Detonated or released on Target
% of Total#Outcomes
Bombs appear to detonated on target and on time more 
frequently against buses (88.21%) than against all targets 
(77.33%) and against trains (74.08%)
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Bus Bomb Attacks: Lethality by Target
Lethality increases for some targets over all bus attacks, especially 
scheduled and school buses; it remains about the same for the 
rest, and the overall average also remains about the same
14 (10)4 (4) Total Overall Average
3 (4) 1 (2) Bus, Tourist
9 (9)1 (1) Bus Station – Unspecified
14 (14)2 (2) Bus Stop (same)
15 (10)3 (2) Bus, School
7 (5)3 (3) Minivan or Minibus
17 (11)6 (5) Bus, Scheduled
Average 
Injuries
Average 
fatalitiesTarget
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All Bus Attacks: Lethality by Attack & Weapon
83Other
133IED - grenade
103Multiple Weapons
154IED - unspecified
144IED - Mine
66Automatic Weapons
39Assault- Other or Unspecified
189vBIED
418Sabotage, Other
2924IED - Claymore Mine
Average
Injuries
Average 
fatalitiesAttack Type
Average 
Injuries
Average 
fatalitiesAttack Type
104Overall Average
10Arson
11Robbery
21IED - Dynamite
11Armed hijacking
101Assault with RPg
51Mortar
11Kidnapping
22IID (Improvised Incendiary Device)
Claymores (Sri Lanka) and Other Sabotage and Assault - (a few events) 
are unique.  vBIEDS, Automatic Weapons, Mines, and IEDs give average 
or better lethality
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Bomb Attacks: Lethality by Device
154IED - unspecified
144Overall Average
21IED - Dynamite
22IID (Improvised Incendiary Device)
133IED - grenade
144IED - Mine
189vBIED
2924IED - Claymore Mine
Average
Injuries
Average 
fatalitiesAttack Type
Claymores unique to Sri Lanka; but vBIEDs and mines used in 
many countries and quite lethal, along with IEDs
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Lethality by Concealment and Delivery
348Carried on Person
144Total
30Concealed/placed outside of Stations
71Physical Thrown
91Concealed/left in Stations (Trash bins, Under benches, near trains or buses)
134Concealed/Left in Passenger Compartments
96Concealed in Parcel or Bags
188Placed near the bus or other target - unspecified
020Concealed/placed in non-passenger areas
Average 
Injuries
Average 
fatalitiesDelivery and Concealment
Suicide is lethal but the same as method used for vBIEDs and 
Claymores, and lower than placing in the non-passenger compartment
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Most Lethal Combinations
Placed near the bus vBIEDBus Station -Unspecified9
Placed near the bus IED - grenadeBus, Scheduled8
Carried on PersonIED - UnspecifiedBus, Scheduled9
Concealed in Parcel or BagsIED - UnspecifiedBus, Scheduled10
Concealed in or on vehicleIED - UnspecifiedBus, Co or gov’t13
Concealed in Parcel or BagsIIDBus, Scheduled14
Placed near the busvBIEDBus, Scheduled17
Carried on PersonIED - UnspecifiedBus, Co or gov’t18
Physically ThrownIED-grenadeBus, Scheduled30
Concealed/Placed in Non-
Passenger AreasIED UnspecifiedBus, Scheduled40
Delivery/ConcealmentDeviceTargetAverage fatalities
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Bus Bomb Attacks:  Attacks and Fatalities 
Over Time
Spikes in fatalities coincide with attacks
Bus Bomb Attacks and fatalities
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Bus Bomb Attacks:  Attacks and Injuries Over Time
Injuries also generally coincide with attacks
Bus Bomb Attacks and Injuries
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APPENDIx B
DECEMBER 3, 2009, PRESENTATION TO DhS BUS 
OPERATOR fOCUS gROUP
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ENDNOTES
1. Brian Michael Jenkins, MTI Report #97-04: Protecting Surface Transportation Systems 
and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case Studies of Best Security Practices and 
a Chronology of Attacks, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, December 
1997.
2. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gerston, MTI Report # 01-07: Protecting Public 
Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research 
on Best Security Practices, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, September 
2001.
3. Twice in December 1994, a disgruntled individual detonated incendiary devices on 
subway trains in New York; he was not connected to any terrorist organization.
4.  Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, MTI Report #09-03: Potential Terrorist 
Uses of Highway-Borne Hazardous Materials, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation 
Institute, January 2010.
5. Ibid.
6. It is important to put these cases in context in terms of actual plots.  Twenty-four of 
the 44 cases involved actual plots.  In 19 of these 24 plots, potential targets were 
identified, and operational plans were discussed.  In 10 of the plots, the would-be 
terrorists actually conducted reconnaissance, and in 11 cases, they possessed, 
acquired, or tried to acquire explosives or other weapons, often without taking much 
care to avoid being identified. 
7. See Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean-François Clair, MTI Report 
# XXXX: Off the Rails;  The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV (High-
Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 91 Rail Sabotage Attempts, San Jose, 
CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, February 2010.
8. The categorization of developed and developing countries may not fit all regions of all 
countries.  Major cities of Turkey and South America are quite developed, yet the two 
countries are categorized as developing. MTI will seek a more updated approach to 
this problem in line with current economic classifications from the United Nations.  
9. This method is used not only to derail trains, which often involves multiple bombs, but 
also in some attacks where bombs are placed near trains.
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